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Abstract 
 
Heartened by Aaron Director’s formation of a law-and-economics cluster at the 
University of Chicago, this paper proposes a new cluster that shares a post nation-
state, city-centered, vision for constitutional organisation. To this end, the paper 
introduces an economic model to illustrate the role of polycentricity in the stability 
and prosperity of polities. The model is inspired by Tinbergen’s gravity model of 
international trade, and two-dimensional lattice models used in theoretical physics. 
The model suggests that constitutional constructs weave an evolutionary dialectic 
between different organisational scales (the local, national, and global). This dialectic 
continues to wreak havoc at the local scale, and can be interrupted only through 
explicit constitutional constraints on the size of ‘jurisdictional footprints’. 
Polycentricity is interpreted in the spirit of (non-contiguous) charter cities, and through 
the scholarship of Baruch Spinoza’s constitutional orders, as exemplified by the Dutch 
Republic (1581-1795). This rendition of sovereignty is imperative as much for 
countries facing the strife of civil war (including Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and the 
Ukraine) as it is for maturing economies. In a globalizing world that is more and more 
imbued with nation-state morbidity, there is a pressing need for a city-centric, 
‘Olympic world system’. A Chicago cluster bringing together scholars such as Gerald 
Frug, Paul Romer, Benjamin Barber, Yishai Blank, and Saskia Sassen, could see this 
vision come to fruition.1 
 
  
                                                          
 Benjamen Gussen is a lecturer in law at the University of Southern Queensland, Australia. His 
research focuses mainly on constitutional economics. Ben’s other areas of research include 
charter cities and complexity economics. For his research profile visit 
http://staffprofile.usq.edu.au/Profile/Benjamen-Gussen .  
1 The Tom Ginsburg Comparative Constitutions Project may be the anvil on which the 
proposed cluster could be forged.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Sovereignty has been a fundamental pillar of the capitalist world-economy,2 since the sixteenth 
century.3 Mercantilism saw the first constitutional rationalization of the exercise of sovereign power as 
a practice of government.4 Later, the nation-state, through its legislative monopoly, became 
indispensable to the conduct of economic enterprise. Probably, the strongest evidence of the link 
between sovereignty and economics comes from the idea of legal tender and the historical evolution of 
(national) territorial currencies.5 The same can be said about the rise of central banks and their influence, 
through sovereignty, on economic activity.6 Some would argue that the tendency to grant independence 
to central banks, and the creation of non-national currencies such as the euro, signifies sovereignty’s 
increasing irrelevance.7 A quick glance at the euro crisis (that continues to unfold since 2008) shows 
why such logic is wanting. In fact, the current drive within the European Union is to ensure that their 
economic integration (through the euro) is matched with a similar political integration.8 This if anything 
suggests a resilient link between economics and politics. Even the analysis of what some theorists 
perceive as the ‘decline’ of sovereignty is also framed in reference to economic systems, where the 
‘decline’ of sovereignty today is seen as a “sign of the acute crisis of capitalism as an historical system”.9  
The link between economics and sovereignty suggests that the latter should be at the heart of 
economic analysis.10 Admittedly, just like most political concepts, sovereignty is intrinsically 
controversial.11 The literature provides a plethora of classes and categories, which could make 
sovereignty difficult to use as an analytical tool.12 Notwithstanding, sovereignty has a common 
denominator that makes it a viable explanatory variable. This denominator is seen in a (political) power 
struggle between three scales: the local, the national, and the global. Within the European context, 
sovereignty grew from the impulse to independence following protracted tensions between medieval 
kings and external powers in the form of popes and emperors.13 From the 16th century and up to the 
1920s power was transferred from local to national levels of governance, and then through globalization 
from national to global governance. The weakening of the role of the nation-state since World War I 
(WW I) saw a reversal of this transfer.  
In this introduction I look at how sovereignty is positioned relative to the analogy between markets 
and politics and the analogy of the state-as-a-machine. The first analogy is based on two elements (see 
below): sovereignty per the ‘individual view of the state’, and a ‘common purpose outcome’. In addition 
                                                          
2 See Charles A. Beard, The Economic Basis of Politics 16 (George Allen & Unwin 1935); Jeremy A. Rabkin, Law without Nations? Why 
Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States 57 (Princeton University Press 2005). Rabkin cites J. Bodin, Lex Six Livres De La 
Republique (1576) IV, 6 trans. M. J. Tooley (Blackwell no date); James A. Dorn, Public Choice and the Constitution: A Madisonian 
Perspective, in Public Choice and Constitutional Economics 58 ed. James D. Gwartney and Richard E. Wagner (JAI Press 1988). According 
to Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: “The state as a person of international law should 
possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into 
relations with the other states”.  
3 Immanuel Wallerstein, States? Sovereignty? The Dilemma of Capitalists in an Age of Transition, in States and Sovereignty in the Global 
Economy 23-25 ed. David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik (Routledge 1999).  
4 Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality 97-98 ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and 
Peter Miller (Harverster Wheatsheaf 1991). 
5 Eric Helleiner, The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective 115 (Cornell University Press 2003). 
6 At 193.  
7 At 241. 
8 See for example Mark Halleberg, Fiscal Federalism Reforms in the European Union and the Greek Crisis, 12 (1) European Union Politics 
127 (2011). 
9 Wallerstein, States? Sovereignty? The Dilemma of Capitalists in an Age of Transition 33. 
10 The concepts of societas and universitas are central to the arguments developed in this paper. For the key work on these concepts see 
Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (England Clarendon Press 1975).  
11 R. B. J. Walker, Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice, in Contending 
Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community 159 ed. R. B. J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Lynne Rienner Publishers 1990).  
12 S.  Veitch, E. A.  Christodoulidis, and L.  Farmer, Jurisprudence: Themes and Concepts at 10-11 (Routledge-Cavendish 2007).  
13 F. H. Hinsely, Sovereignty, especially Chapter 3 (C. A. Watts & Co Ltd 1966). See also Raia Prokhovnik, Sovereignty: History and 
Theory (Imprint Academic 2008). 
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to the state-as-a-machine analogy (which I discuss in more detail later in the paper) these elements 
introduce tension between societas and universitas. Namely, the analogy requires sovereignty (for there 
to be a power exchange). However, the ‘common purpose’ requirement excludes sovereignty. In Part II 
I show how this tension is resolved through ‘polycentricity’.  
I now clarify what I mean by ‘sovereign’. Etymologically, the word derives from the popular Latin 
for ‘above’ (superānus),14 as in ‘more powerful’, suggesting a relational basis between two parties, 
usually represented as a ruler and ruled. Sovereignty is hence predicated on the concept of the state.15 
However, it would be possible to have a state without sovereignty (under universitas).16 The state is a 
system of legitimization through which (political) power (the ability to influence the action of others) 
is transformed (through the actualization of a constitution) into (a final and absolute) authority where 
(through public law) a government regulates relationships (between certain people and over a certain 
territory).17  
With the above understanding we proceed to ascertain the relevance of sovereignty to economics. 
In The Calculus of Consent the analysis of the market as an evolutionary selection process was extended 
to politics,18 by using an exchange paradigm to describe cooperative interactions.19 This exchange 
analogy carries ‘relational’ tones where20  
 
[b]oth the economic relation and the political relation represent co-operation on the part of 
two or more individuals. The market and the State are both devices through which co-
operation is organized and made possible … At base, political or collective action under the 
individualistic view of the State is much the same. Two or more individuals find it mutually 
advantageous to join forces to accomplish certain common purposes. In a very real sense, they 
“exchange” inputs in the securing of the commonly shared output … they will find it mutually 
advantageous to enter into a political “exchange” and devote resources to the construction of 
the common good. (Emphasis added) 
 
In markets, such relational tones predominate in meso communities, where relationships continue to 
be multi-dimensional and personal.21 This suggests a scalar anchor for the analogy to work, which I 
discuss later in the paper. This formulation of a political power exchange has a Foucauldian overtone, 
where power is a “certain type of relation between individuals”.22 Similarly, to bring sovereignty into 
this exchange process we need a relational definition.23 We define sovereignty à la Spinoza.24 Hence 
                                                          
14 Sovereign, in The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press 1989). 
15 Hinsely, Sovereignty, at 2 and 30.  
16 Charles Edward  Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau at 552, in Studies in History Economics and Public Law 
ed. The Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University (Columbia University Press 1900). 
17 Hinsely, Sovereignty, at 25 and 131.  
18 James A. Buchanan, Public Choice after Socialism, 77 Public Choice 67, 69 (1993). This particular extension is difficult to accommodate 
with some of Buchanan’s other constructs, especially his rejection of the state as an organism. See below for further discussion.  
19 James M. Buchanan, The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order at 31 (The University of Michigan Press 1991).  
20 James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy at 19 (University of 
Michigan Press 1962).  
21 See for example George Silberbauer, Ethics in Small-Scale Societies at 17, in A Companion to Ethics ed. Peter Singer, 14 (Blackwell 
1994). 
22 Michel Foucault, Power at 324 (New Press 2000). For Foucault’s views on sovereignty see Brian C. J. Singer and Lorna Weir, Politics 
and Sovereign Power: Considerations on Foucault, 9 European Journal of Social Theory 443 (2006). 
23 See Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law at 81-86 (Oxford University Press 2003). 
24 Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy at 313. Note however, as a critique of 
The Calculus of Consent we should continue the above quote where it is stated that: 
 
Spinoza’s influence on our own ideas has been limited to his general and indirect effects on the Western intellectual tradition. 
In a specific sense, we have carefully reviewed Spinoza only after the completion of an initial draft of the main body of this 
book [The Calculus of Consent]. (Emphasis added)  
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we take sovereignty to be an abstract notion (albeit not ahistorical one) of “the relationship between 
rulers and ruled for the exercise of political power [and] the independent status of the body politic on 
the international stage”.25 Sovereignty represents a ‘dynamic tension’ through which power is shared.26 
Under this understanding, sovereignty “is not a substantive quality to be possessed but rather a condition 
of political interactions, embedded in [relations] that ground association”.27 Here sovereignty becomes 
the exchange process taking place at the input to the state transformation of power into authority. It is 
the source from which the state makes binding law in a particular territory.28 While primarily involving 
a duality of ‘ruler’ and ‘ruled’, sovereignty inevitably faces the intervention of other parties through 
integration processes such as globalization.  
Under ‘the individualistic view of the State’, the state is understood as a societas. The problem with 
this understanding is that the market analogy envisages power exchange to result in a ‘common good’,29 
which suggests a universitas understanding of the state. The stability of the tension inherent in this 
‘hybrid’ understanding of the state is achieved through a ‘polycentric’ constitutional order (see Part II).  
Historically there have been two prominent conceptions of the state: the state as a societas, and as a 
universitas.30 These conceptions are dialectical.31 Nevertheless, as I discuss below, there are epochs 
were one or the other dominates. We argue that sovereignty (as defined above) exists only where 
societas dominates. This in turn means that sovereignty has a staccato existence. It experiences long 
periods of ‘occultation’ due to the emergence (under universitas) of higher levels of political 
organisation.  From the perspective of sovereignty as a power exchange, this pattern would indicate 
pathologies in the nature of market failure due to liquidity issues (market depth). However, this pattern 
is also necessary for the stability of polities as I discuss in Part III.  
The first conception, societas, is a civil condition,32 a contractarian form of association where the 
state is analogous to a partnership.33 A state understood as a societas is the product of “a formal 
relationship in terms of rules, not a substantive relationship in terms of common action”.34 Moreover, 
“what is intrinsic to this mode of association is not the choice to be related but the recognition of 
understood terms of relationships”.35 Societas is seen to represent political relationships under 
democratic conditions.36 
Universitas, or a corporation,37 is where individuals are associated in “a partnership of persons which 
is itself a Person”.38  Universitas was advanced by the creation and extension of a central apparatus of 
ruling which was “totally indifferent to the constitution of a government … Nor is related to 
[sovereignty]”.39 A universitas is distinguished from a societas also in its identification of a common 
purpose and a substantive end.40 This common purpose leads to policies of integration as for example 
                                                          
25 Raia Prokhovnik, Spinoza's Conception of Sovereignty, 27 History of European Ideas 289 (2001).  
26 Raia Prokhovnik, Sovereignties: Contemporary Theory and Practice at 229 (Palgrave Macmillan 2007).  
27 Adam T. Smith, Archaeologies of Sovereignty, 40 Annual Review of Anthropology 415, 426 (2011).  
28 Rabkin, Law without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States at 38.  
29 Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy at 19.  
30 See Oakeshott, On Human Conduct at 200. There are other topologies which could be used to enrich the analysis of different forms of the 
state. For example, Hayek's distinction between teleocratic and nomocratic ordering, and Habermas’ account of system integration and 
social integration. See Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law at 204 (Oxford University Press, 2010), and The Idea of Public Law at 
13-19. Oakeshott’s topology, however, furnishes a historical account that better explains the issues surrounding sovereignty.  
31 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process at 14 and 46 (Harvard University Press 1971). 
32 J. R. Archer, Oakeshott on Politics, 41 (1) The journal of Politics 150, 162 (1979). 
33 L. O'Sullivan, Michael Oakeshott on European Political History, 21 (1) History of political thought 132, 141 (2000). 
34 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct at 201.  
35 At 202. 
36 Chantal Mouffe, Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community, in Community at Loose Ends at 76 and 78 ed. The Miami Theory 
Collective (University of Minnesota Press 1991). 
37 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct at 200.  
38 At 203. 
39 At 267. 
40 At 205. 
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in medieval Europe.41 In contrast to a societas, choice is intrinsic to membership of a universitas, 
although not when the state itself is understood as a universitas.42  
Sovereignty’s theories from the sixteenth century to this day are variations on the theme of power 
exchange between the dualism of ruler and ruled. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the 
“individualistic, contractualistic” approach, adopted by Buchanan and Tullock for the power exchange 
analogy,43 dominates. 44 This approach is influenced by the societas view of the state.45 In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as a reaction to the revolutionary tendencies that emanated from 
earlier theories of sovereignty, the state was perceived in its historical context, either as a product of 
tradition and custom,46 or as a natural evolutionary necessity,47 or as a patrimonial source of authority.48 
Now the state was seen as an organism imposed on the people, capable of action beyond that taken by 
its constituent members. This organic-state tradition is orthogonal to the contractarian approach. 
Sometimes, the state is understood as a mechanism that cannot be larger than the sum of its 
(individual-based) parts. 49 This understanding chimes, for example, with the Roman idea of the state,50 
and the Wicksellian approach.51 The mechanistic view negates the possibility of treating the state as a 
legal person and hence closes the door on the jurisprudential dimension of the state as a universitas.52  
All theories of sovereignty, however, can be reconciled with the idea of power transfer. Later 
theories (of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) envisage a power transfer in an ‘original position’ 
that never dissipates. The quantum originally transferred enables the state to continue to function 
indefinitely. On the other hand, early (sixteenth century) theories anticipated the legal instruments to 
become blunt, unable to neither stop unwanted activities nor deliver wanted ones. This loss of 
effectiveness was seen as due to power ‘dissipation’ which required new transfers between ruler and 
ruled.  
So far, one point provides a common thread throughout sovereignty’s classifications: the state is 
perceived as a societas rather than a universitas.53 . Sovereignty is largely built on the idea of consensual 
authority (at least outside times of crisis). Universitas on the other hand, as exemplified in empire or 
‘global governance’, “rests on the quite different premise that legislative consent to law is not so 
important to the authority of the law … [under universitas] there is no great choices left to make”.54 For 
sovereignty to arise, a society must have already been established as separate from the state.55 The 
existence of such a socii, while a necessary condition, is not enough for sovereignty to emerge. There 
also needs to be an exchange of power through what came to be known as the ‘social contract’.56  
Sovereignty has a scalar anchor. Together with the idea of constitutionality (and its inherent 
consensual nature), sovereignty is not possible on a global scale. Sovereignty “evolved from a judicial 
concept focusing on the fight to make laws domestically to a political-science definition focusing on 
                                                          
41 At 281. 
42 O'Sullivan, Michael Oakeshott on European Political History at 144; Archer, Oakeshott on Politics at 162. See Oakeshott, On Human 
Conduct at 157-158.  
43 Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy at 19. 
44 Oakeshott, On Human Conduc at 251. 
45 Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau at 391. 
46 At 393.  
47 At 395. 
48 At 393. 
49 Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy at 12. See generally Chapter 2.  
50 Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau at 109.  
51 Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation at 77, in Classics in the Theory of Public Fiance 72 ed. Richard Musgrave and Alan 
Peacock (Macmillan and Company 1994).  
52 Lars Udehn, Methodological Individualism: Background, History and Meaning at 100 (Routledge 2001). See Max Weber, Essay on Some 
Categories of Interpretive Sociology, 22 The Sociological Quarterly 145, 159 (1981).  
53 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct at 251-252.  
54 Rabkin, Law without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States at 41.  
55 Hinsely, Sovereignty at 32.  
56 At 131. 
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power and a state’s independence from outside actors”57 (emphasis added). Sovereignty “imply[s] a 
community that can regulate itself without the approval or direction of higher powers outside the 
community”58 (emphasis added). Sovereignty pertains to a scale above the individual but one which has 
other scales above it. This justifies the need for ‘independence from outside actors’. Sovereignty can be 
at sub-national or national scales but cannot be global. This suggests that the genesis of sovereignty lies 
in local autonomy from where claims of sovereignty later migrated to the national scale. Sovereignty is 
therefore the essence of the ‘meso’ scale. 
At scales beyond the national, instead of sovereignty, we find subsidiarity.59 The state qua 
universitas replaces sovereignty with subsidiarity. Sovereignty was developed to furnish justification 
for ‘who’ holds supreme power. Subsidiarity focuses instead on ‘how’ that supreme power is 
distributed. While some theorists trace the origin of this principle to ancient Greece,60 others suggest it 
has evolved within federal governmental regimes.61 Yet others argue subsidiarity derive from 
methodological individualism,62 suggesting a bottom up legitimization of authority.63 A detailed 
analysis of the principle of subsidiarity can be found in Appendix II.  
Regardless of its origin or rational basis, subsidiarity poses a threat to sovereignty,64 mainly via its 
association with human rights.65  Subsidiarity “does not reconstitute the sovereign state as the object of 
its concern. It explicitly contemplates intervention and assistance for the purpose of protecting human 
dignity”.66  A nexus with human rights means that the principle is not contractarian. Furthermore, today 
the principle does not make any normative claims on the structure of political or economic 
organization.67 There is a strong version of subsidiarity which intermediates between universitas and 
secession where “[the nation-state] must defend its legitimacy against claims from communities 
demanding greater control over decision making”.68 Subsidiarity remains paradoxical in that it limits 
the state, but also empowers and justifies it. It reduces the relationship between the national and the 
local scales to a one-dimensional functional exchange.69  
The closest that economics comes to dealing directly with the structure of the state as universitas 
(and its tension with sovereignty) is through analysis of a right to exit or secede.70 Such possibilities are 
of constitutional relevance,71 and “function so as to reduce redistributive conflicts and make welfare-
increasing transactions possible”.72 Under such exit option, reputation and trust “will be important and 
result in cooperative behavior by individuals”.73 Buchanan suggests that the option to exit is also implied 
in the US Constitution,74 although after the Civil War, secession was no more an option to the States.  
                                                          
57 Scot Macdonald and Gunnar Nielsson, Linkages between the Concepts of 'Subsidiarity' and Sovereignty: The New Debate over Allocation 
of Authority in the European Union, in Fourth European Union Studies Association (Eusa) Biennial Conference (1995). 
58 Rabkin, Law without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States at 51. 
59 At 43. 
60 Chantal Millon-Delsol, L'état Subsidiaire : Ingérence Et Non-Ingérence De L'état, Le Principe De Subsidiarité Aux Fondements De 
L'histoire Européenne at 15-27 (Presses Universitaires de France 1992). 
61 Macdonald and Nielsson, Linkages between the Concepts of 'Subsidiarity' and Sovereignty: The New Debate over Allocation of Authority 
in the European Union.  
62 Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 (38) The American Journal of 
International Law 42 (2003). 
63 Macdonald and Nielsson, Linkages between the Concepts of 'Subsidiarity' and Sovereignty: The New Debate over Allocation of Authority 
in the European Union.  
64 John Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union at 26 (Cavendish Publishing 
2002).  
65 See Donald W. Livingston, Secession and the Modern State, Stalking the Wild Taboo (1996) < http://archive.is/yCvWU >.  
66 Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law at 58.  
67 At 44.  
68 Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union at 29.  
69 Millon-Delsol, L'état Subsidiaire : Ingérence Et Non-Ingérence De L'état, Le Principe De Subsidiarité Aux Fondements De L'histoire 
Européenne at 8.  
70 For an introduction to secession, see Alexander Pavkovic and Peter Radan, eds., Secession (Ashgate 2011). 
71 Ludwig von Mises, The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth at 109 (Van Nostrand 1962). 
72 Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Opting-Out: The Constitutional Economics of Exit, 61 (1) Journal of Economics and Sociology 123 (2002).  
73 At 140. 
74 James A. Buchanan, Europe's Constitutional Future  at 5 (London Institute of Economic Affairs 1990).  
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Without proper constitutional constraints (à la Spinoza) there will always be a cyclical dynamic that 
underlines the struggle between societas and universitas. This tension results in extended periods where 
the power exchange underlying sovereignty is frozen.  
 
II. POLYCENTRIC CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS 
 
The nation-state is obsolete. It is no more the optimal unit for organizing economic activity.75 A new 
form of ‘universitas’ is attacking sovereignty not from within the (nation) state, but by attacking the 
state itself.76 Moreover, there is now a decoupling of the democratic process from the bulk of the 
working population.77 These gyrations are summed up by Gianni De Michelis, a former foreign minister 
of Italy, as follows: “We are witnessing the explosion of a long-obsolete model of liberal democracy 
that can no longer accommodate our dynamic, complex societies with their sophisticated electorate of 
vast diversity and highly differentiated interest”.78  More recently, the European Union president, in a 
speech to mark the 21st anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, has declared that “the time of the 
homogenous nation-state is over”.79 
 
 
A. The End of the Contiguous Non-Perforated Polity 
 
A new conception of the nation-state has emerged: the state as a network, 80 which  “signals the end of 
… sovereignty based on a territorial unit”.81 The link between sovereignty and territoriality is being 
replaced by arrangements where state jurisdiction is punctured by multi-level governance.82 The 
empirical and theoretical developments of the late twentieth century have “led to a more fundamental 
questioning of how national boarders themselves have been conceptualized”.83 Similarly, in the 
European context, one can identify two constitutional revolutions since the end of World War II 
(WWII). The first is resulting in the more visible creation of pan-European institutions. The second is 
the counter-unitary-state revolution that started in the 1920s, but reached its height in the decades after 
WWII. There is now evidence of the emergence of ‘polycentric states’.84 Sovereignty is hence targeted 
by ‘the unravelling of territoriality’, which is a constitutive element of the state. A prime example of 
this is the disappearance of “territorially homogenous and exclusive” currencies  that “accompanied the 
emergence of the ‘nation- state,”85 and the challenge seen in the growth of ‘local currencies’.86  
                                                          
75 See for example, Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of the Regional Economics  (HarperCollins 1995). See also Jean-
Marie Guéhenno, The End of the Nation-State trans. Victoria Elliott (University of Mnnesota Press 1995), Daniel Chernilo, A Social Theory 
of the Nation-State (Routledge 2007), and David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, eds. States and Sovereignty in the 
Global Economy (Routledge 1999).   
76 Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of the Regional Economics  at 16.  
77 At 56. 
78 At 60. 
79 Herman Van Rompuy, A Curtain Went up - Ein Vorhang Ging Auf (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung - Stiftung Zukunft Berlin - Robert-Bosch-
Stiftung Pergamon Museum, PCE 256/10, 9 November 2010).  
80 J. Agnew and S.  Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory, and International Political Economy at 89 (Routledge 1995). Cited 
in Andrew Herod, Scale at 200 (Routledge 2011).  
81 Martin Loughlin, Ten Tenets of Sovereignty at 108-109, in Relocating Sovereignty 79 ed. Neil Walker (Ashgate Dartmouth 2006).  
82 J. Allen and A.  Cochrane, Beyond the Territorial Fix: Regional Assemblages, Politics and Power, 41 (9) Regional Studies 1161 (2007). 
Cited in Herod, Scale at 201.  
83 Scale at 201-202. 
84 K. Morgan, The Polycentric State: New Spaces of Empowerment and Engagement?, 41 (9) Regional Studies 1237, 1238 (2007).  
85 Eric Helleiner, Sovereignty, Territoriality and the Globalization of Finance at 151-152, in States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy 
138 ed. David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik (Routledge 1999).  
86 At 152. 
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The effect of universitas (qua economic integration through the modality of globalization) on 
sovereignty is part of a cyclical process indigenous to capital accumulation, where the pendulum swings 
between the polar positions of universitas and societas. The last five centuries have seen emphasis on 
universitas, first in the European context, and later on globally through instruments of international 
law.87 The scale of the present wave of economic integration suggests a continuing crescendo of this 
universitas.88  I use a five-hundred-year cycle as a stylized indicator from which we can glean the 
oscillation between societas and universitas. This can be seen by tracing the local autonomy of 
European cities for the last 2000 years.89 Up to the fifth century, in Western Europe, the collapse of the 
Roman Empire was accompanied by population and economic decay that resulted in the demise of 
many towns.90 The breakdown of central authority would nevertheless provide impetus for a form of 
societas that continued until the fifth century. The medieval universitas remained the norm until the 
sixteenth century when the Italian Renaissance (through the rise of city-states) and the German 
Reformation (through the drive for political authority over religious matters) started to undermine its 
dominance. From the fifth to the tenth centuries, there was a form of religious universitas resulting from 
the spread of Christianity and Islam. We can trace a form of societas developing at the end of the tenth 
century when local autonomy was granted by charters such as in Italy, when “Genoa claimed its first 
charter in 958, Mantua in 1014, Brescia in 1038, and Ferrara in 1055”.91 This trend of local autonomy 
spread to other parts of Europe and continued until the sixteenth century, thanks to “the growing success 
of town governments in managing their finances”.92 By the end of the fifteenth century, there were 
around five hundred independent political units.93 The demise of these polities, however, could be traced 
to the fourteenth century when “leading cities extended their hinterlands and control over smaller 
cities”.94  
By the time of the Renaissance and the French Revolution we see the loose city networks  that 
formed the societas between 1000 and 1500 AD become consolidated across the continent in forms of 
‘nation-building’ that “saw a general diminution in the local independence of local communities”95 
through the “widespread interference of the state …”96 This migration of sovereignty to the national 
level reached its zenith with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which later ushered a new 
form of universitas based on international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948.97 The sixteenth century is the historical origin of the modern capitalist world-
economy,98 and in this sense, is the genesis of a new form of universitas (qua economic integration). 
This universitas was transferred to outside the continent in how European states governed their imperial 
possessions. As a response, another form of universitas came to prominence: federalism especially as 
illustrated by the United States of America. Other forms of universitas were registered in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries under failed French (Napoleon) and German (Hitler) campaigns. In the early 
twenty-first century, especially as the Euro zone crisis continues to unfold, we see further attempts 
towards universitas, in the form of the European Union.  
 
                                                          
87 Giovanni Arrighi, Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the ‘Endless’ Accumulation of Capital. 
88 At 55. 
89 See generally Peter Clark, European Cities and Towns 400-2000 (Oxford University Press 2009). 
90 At 103. 
91 At 91. 
92 At 101. 
93 Joseph A. Camilleri, Rethinking Sovereignty in a Shrinking Fragmented World at 14, in Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political 
Community 13 ed. R. B. J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Lynne Rienner Publishers 1990 ).  
94 Clark, European Cities and Towns 400-2000 at 97. 
95 At 202. 
96 At 208. 
97 Some theorists suggest that the effect of the Peace of Westphalia is largely mythical. See Prokhovnik, Sovereignties: Contemporary 
Theory and Practice at 60. The use the treaty is still useful for a demarcation of a new era of universitas.  
98 Wallerstein, States? Sovereignty? The Dilemma of Capitalists in an Age of Transition.  
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B. The Divisibility of Sovereignty and Polycentricity 
 
The analogy between markets and politics imports a third dimension in addition to the homo economicus 
and the exchange process, namely competition. In order for markets to function properly (i.e. to be 
Pareto efficient) one needs to ensure a level of competition in the provision of goods and services. An 
analogy with politics would see this competition reflected in the provision of goods of public nature, 
through competing jurisdictions, or what came to be known as systems competition.99  
After the Hobbesian Leviathan, a sovereign state was conceived of as a territorial jurisdiction: “the 
territorial limits within which state authority may be exercised on an exclusive basis”100 (emphasis 
added). Today, however, “[e]merging forms of ‘complex sovereignty’ break down the internal 
structural coherence of the state”.101 Today’s jurisprudence “became the jurisprudence of a fracturing 
state, characterized by polycentric centers of power …”102  
These polycentric centers of power are an extension of the idea of divisibility of sovereignty which 
could be traced back to ancient Greece.103  However, the divisibility of sovereignty did not re-emerge 
until 1756 when John Locke revived the idea of the Social Contract, paving the way for the rise of 
federal states as exemplified by the United States (US 1789 constitution ),104 and the Swiss federation 
(in the 1848, 1874, and 1999 constitutions).105 The divisibility of sovereignty registers particularly 
through endorsement of the scholarship of Spinoza.106 Spinoza separates the constitutional and 
operational levels of collective decision-making, hence allowing for the possibility of a divided 
sovereignty. This is the approach followed in constitutional economics.107 For Spinoza, who allied 
himself with the Dutch republican movement, sovereignty is not repugnant to principles of provincial 
autonomy. It could be in fact argued that the purpose of Spinoza’s sovereignty is “to check the 
development of centralized government, not to promote it”.108  
However, divided sovereignty was expected to still operate from within the state. Since the signing 
of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and especially in the post-Napoleonic era (after 1815), “a prominent 
operating principle regulating the size and shape of states has indeed been that states should be 
contiguous and non-perforated”109 (emphasis added). This should be understood in relation to the 
observation that “the Westphalian State is … bound symbiotically to the ideology of nationalism”.110 
The relationship between sovereignty and territory is captured by the principle of uti possidetis juris 
“according to which existing [state] boundaries are the pre-emptive basis for determining territorial 
jurisdictions in the absence of mutual agreement to do otherwise”.111 In particular, this principle 
                                                          
99 See Hans-Werner Sinn, The New Systems Competition (Blackwell 2002). 
100 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape, in Relocating Sovereignty 3 ed. 
Neil Walker (Ashgate Dartmouth 2006). Published earlier in 47 (3) Political Studies 431 (1999).  
101 Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From Political to Economic Constitutionalism? at 367 in Neil 
Walker (ed) Relocating Sovereignty 361 (Ashgate Dartmouth 2006).  
102 At 372. 
103 Aristotle, The Politics VII, 1326 b, 1-26 trans. H. Rackham (Harvard University Press 1967). For a discussion of the divided nature of 
Aristotle’s sovereignty, see e.g. R. G. Mulgan, Aristotle's Sovereign, 18 (4) Political Studies 518 (1970).  
104 Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau at 161.  
105 For example Art 3 of the 1999 Constitution.  
106 Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy at 297.  
107 At 298. Refer to Baruch Spinoza, A Treatise on Politics trans. William Macall (Holy-Oake 1854).  
108 Prokhovnik, Spinoza's Conception of Sovereignty at 297.  
109 Kurrild-Klitgaard, Opting-Out: The Constitutional Economics of Exit at 146, citing B.  Smith, The Cognitive Geometry of War, in 
Current Issues in Political Philosophy ed. P. Koller and K. Puhl (Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1997). Also published in 61 (1) American Journal 
of Economics and Sociology 123 (2002).  
110 Stephen Tierney, Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the Nation-State at 245, in 
Relocating Sovereignty 239 ed. Neil Walker (Ashgate Dartmouth 2006). Also published in 54 International and Comparative Legal 
Quarterly 161.  
111 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape at 19. 
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subordinated the principle of self-determination to boundaries decided by colonial power: juridical-
territories trumped sociological-territories.112  
The ‘modern state ideal’ is described as that where “a political economy would very much seem to 
be that of a geographically circumscribed area within which exists a more or less fixed political 
hierarchy, which includes all individuals and all political institutions, and whose physical extension is 
contiguous and non-perforated”.113 It could be argued that the collapse of the gold standard, the 
emergence of Keynesian economics, and European decolonization had the combined effect that in the 
mid-twentieth century the world increasingly came to be “pictured in the form of nation-states, with 
each state marking the boundary of a distinct economy”.114 The nation-state (since the eighteenth 
century) remains the principal territorial unit. Nations result from a process of production of scale that 
is enforced on a given territory. France is a prime example of this process.115 Critique of this national 
scale and the contiguous non-porous nation-state is relatively rare in the (constitutional) political 
economy literature, notwithstanding the now widely accepted claim that a decentralized political 
community would better meet heterogeneous individual preferences.116 Keeping in mind of course that 
decentralization would obtain only under the auspices of the nation-state.  
 
 
C. Renditions of Polycentric Constitutional Orders 
 
Today, the contiguous-and-non-perforated-state principle is being challenged by new conceptions of 
the state as well as its sovereignty.117 However, while there is an on-going shift towards seeing the state 
as constituted on non-contiguous basis, using the analogy with the idea of a ‘polycentric’ legal order 
(implying a multiplicity of independent centers of decisionmaking),118 there is no extensive (economic) 
evaluation of the need for, or merit of, an analogous ‘polycentric’ constitutional order.119 Here the 
emphasis would be on maximizing constitutional options rather than deciding among constraints per 
se. Instead, the assumption is usually made that “there is a state or a commonwealth, without exploring 
the question of which domain [a scalar construct] this commonwealth or state should actually occupy, 
and in relation to what other public bodies”.120  
There are however some attempts in this direction. For example, the work by Bruno Frey and Reiner 
Eichenberger on what they call functionally overlapping competing jurisdictions (FOCJ).121 To inhibit 
the overextension of government, others also suggest separate jurisdictions with some protected powers 
within a constitutional federation.122 Where migration is facilitated between such separate jurisdictions, 
there are tangents with the Tiebout model in relation to sorting individuals according to their 
preferences.123 A more promising scholarship is that of Vincent Ostrom.124 For Ostrom, ‘polycentric’ 
                                                          
112 At 15.  
113 Kurrild-Klitgaard, Opting-Out: The Constitutional Economics of Exit at 124. 
114 Timothy Mitchell, Fixing the Economy, 12 (1) Cultural Studies 82, 90 (1998).  
115 Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union at 8. 
116 See for example Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. 
117 Kurrild-Klitgaard, Opting-Out: The Constitutional Economics of Exit at 146.  
118 Friedrich A. Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty:  A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy (The 
University of Chicago Press 1983). See also Tom W. Bell, Polycentric Law, 7 (1) Institute of Humane Studies Review (1991). 
119 R. E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law, especially Chapter 14 (Clarendon Press  1998).  
120 Jürgen G. Backhaus, Subsidiarity at 137, in The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics 136, ed. Jürgen G. Backhaus (Edward Elgar 
1999).  
121 Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, The New Democratic Federalism for Europe: Functional, Overlapping and Competing 
Jurisdictions (Edward Elgar 1999).  
122 Ludwig Van den Hauwe, Constitutional Economics, in The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics 100 ed. Jürgen G. Backhaus 
(Edward Elgar 1999), 112.   
123 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 (5) Journal of Political Economy 416 (1956).  
124 Richard E. Wagner, Self-Governance, Polycentrism, and Federalism: Recurring Themes in Vincent Ostrom's Scholarly Oeuvre, 57 (2) 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation 173 (2005).  
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“connotes many centers of decision-making which are formally independent of each other … [but] may 
be said to function as a ‘system’”.125 However, his polycentricity has a strong functional ‘taste’ largely 
divorced from the power calculus at the heart of divided sovereignty.  
Such non-contiguous states are at the center of Spinoza’s discourse.126 Buchanan echoes Spinoza 
when he explains his idea of federalism as “diversity among separate co-operative communities, of 
shared sovereignty, of effective devolution of political authority and, perhaps most importantly, of the 
limits on such authority”127 (emphasis in the original). Buchanan envisaged a “federal union within 
which members of separate units cooperate …” and share sovereignty, where constitutional 
requirements guarantee free trade, and with a monetary constitution based on competing national 
currencies.128  
Spinozistic sovereignty provides a model:129  
 
in which powers are shared between sovereign bodies … which reaffirm their separateness … 
In federal systems such as the United States or in Australia, legislative, judicial and executive 
powers are distributed between federal and different state governments … under [Spinozistic 
sovereignty], however, ‘confederal’ powers … were extremely closely restricted … Rather 
than attempting to harmonize differences … [it upholds] the constructiveness of difference …   
 
In summary, one can trace the logic of limiting the ‘jurisdictional footprints’ of states within a 
polycentric constitutional set up back to Aristotle and Spinoza. Some pronouncements from 
constitutional economics seem to strongly echo the same ideas. It is conceded that “Spinoza’s notion of 
sovereignty could not be ‘applied’ to contemporary Europe in some easy fashion as a simple 
solution”.130 However, there has not yet been much emphasis on this aspect of the analysis when it 
comes to normative constitutional design. It is submitted that such emphasis would see countries with 
a footprint as large as Russia and China, and even the United States, questioned as to constitutional 
viability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
125 Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren, The Organization of Goverment in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 
55 American Political Science Review 831 (1961).  
126 Prokhovnik, Spinoza's Conception of Sovereignty, 300-01. Refer to Benedict de Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatis and a Political 
Treatise at 347-48, 56-57, 70, 83, and 84 (Dover Publications 1951). Note that according to Spinoza’s definition of democracy, modern 
representative democracy would be regarded as a modality of aristocracy, “because our legislative bodies are, like his definition of 
aristocracy, ‘composed of certain chosen persons’”: Raia Prokhovnik, From Democaracy to Aristocracy: Spinoza, Reason and Politics, 23 
(2-4) History of European Ideas 105, 107 (1997). See also George M. Gross, Spinoza and the Federal Polity, 26 (1) Publius 117 (1996); 
Raia Prokhovnik, Spinoza and Republicanism (Palgrave Macmillan 2004); Jonathan Havercroft, The Fickle Multitude: Spinoza and the 
Problem of Global Democracy, 17 (1) Constellations 120 (2010); Etienne Balibar, Ted Stolze, and Emilia Giancotti, Spinoza, the Anti-
Orwell: The Fear of the Masses, 2 (3) Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society 104 (1989).  
127 Buchanan, Europe's Constitutional Future at 3-4.  
128 At 18. 
129 Prokhovnik, Sovereignties: Contemporary Theory and Practice at 228.  
130 At 231. 
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III. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF POLITICAL ORGANISATION 
 
In this part I model the dynamics of power exchange and their impact on sovereignty. The details of the 
model and its mathematical expression can be found in the Appendix. The model explains the oscillation 
between societas and universitas and suggests polycentricity is the only stable governance structure. I 
assume sovereign polities are distributed into quartets on a two-dimensional lattice as shown in Figure 
3.1. Quartets are assumed to be distributed randomly over the entire lattice. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Top view of the original distribution of sovereign polities 
 
 
Lattice sites could be either occupied or vacant. When occupied, they have sovereign polities 
represented by spheres with equal mass (𝑚). The mass is a proxy for each polity’s land and population 
endowment, and hence cannot grow indefinitely given the limits on the land resource, and by 
implication on population. We refer to this mass as the socio-political mass. We assume the lattice to 
be frictionless such that the cost incurred by polities for drifting from one site to another is de minimis.   
Polities occupy vortices of squares of side length d. The distance between sovereign polities 
represents a proxy for “relational distance” rather than a physical distance per se. The longer the 
distance, the less is the interaction between polities. When the distance is zero, the polity transfers all 
of its sovereignty to a union with another polity which takes over the decision making process. 
Sovereignty is maximized when the distance between polities is infinite.  
In this model wealth is generated through trade with other polities. The trade flow is analogous to 
that given by the Tinbergen gravitational model.131 Sovereignty and wealth are hence inversely 
proportional. Political power arises from relative rather than absolute wealth. Relative wealth can then 
be transformed into other forms of power such as coercion and knowledge.132 The existence of relative 
wealth indicates a transfer of sovereignty from one polity to another.  
Wealth distribution is proportional to the socio-political masses. Larger polities obtain a larger share 
of the trade. Hence if a polity of mass 2𝑚 trades with a polity of mass  𝑚 over one trade channel, the 
larger polity takes two-thirds the wealth from trade.  
Moreover, we assume the ruler-ruled relationship in polities formed through fusion (nation-states or 
the universitas) to be benevolent. In other words, the wealth generated from trade is shared equally 
between polities constituting the political union.  
Each polity has the objective of increasing its total wealth (𝑊). This is done through a mixed 
strategy of rearranging the original square formation (short-term strategy), and by acquiring power (𝑃) 
                                                          
131 Jan Tinbergen, Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy (Twentieth Century Fund 1962). 
132 See Alvin Toffler, Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century (Bantam 1991). 
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which could then be used to generate more wealth (long-term strategy). Power results from (territorial) 
fusion which represents the evolution of nation-states towards a universitas that subsumes the 
sovereignty of its constituent polities. Given the historical oscillation between societas and universitas, 
we assume the expected power to average out over time. A polity with zero or negative power would 
prefer to drift to another lattice site if it believes its expected power from doing so to be non-negative.  
Nation-states would be stable as long as the transfer of sovereignty to the nation-state is paid for by 
a wealth differential (power over the other polities outside the nation). The decision by each polity to 
join a political union depends on the power it secures in exchange for its sovereignty. If the power 
differential disappears, the fusion becomes unstable and, overtime, political (territorial) fission ensues 
and polities drift away from the quartet.  
In order to maximize wealth, the quartet moves from the two-dimensional square formation where 
all polities occupy sites on the lattice to a three dimensional hierarchy―a pyramid arrangement. I 
interpret as representative of polycentricity. The pyramid arrangement embodies the power exchange 
idea as stated by Buchanan and Tullock.133   
I now analyze the rationale for the creation of nation-states and universitas. Instead of the original 
square arrangement, polity A could negotiate a social contract where polity B exchanges its sovereignty 
through a total fusion. This arrangement is analogous to a federal arrangement rather than a unitary 
state. Polities within the federal state are still able to trade directly with polities outside the union. The 
resulting negative power suggests the created nation-state is unstable, and that the configuration of a 
federal state is untenable. By opting for a unitary nation rather than a federal state, the nation polities 
of A and B will have power over polity C but not polity D. The resulting unitary nation has power over 
both C and D. This would go to explain why federal systems become more centralized over time.  
At this juncture, it is useful to point out how war, either for the objective of acquiring another 
sovereign polity or for keeping it in an existing union, would increase the power of the resulting nation-
state. When war is waged on a polity, that polity is not only ‘lifted off’ the lattice, but its identity is 
erased to the effect that power is now calculated from the perspective of the resulting nation. The cost 
of war is seen in the lost trade channels by the polities involved.  This explains the incentives for political 
fusion associated with war on polities outside the union, or by civil war. An example of this approach 
can be seen in the United States both through the American War of Independence (1775 to 1783) and 
the American Civil War (1861 to 1865).  
Why then do we see relatively stable nation-states (and universitas)? I have already eluded to war 
as stabilizing fusion. Another stabilization strategy emerges from how the nation-state externalizes the 
cost of fusing its socio-political mass. This stabilization is interpreted as a perpetual need to increase 
trade with polities outside the original quartet, which echoes the neo-liberal emphasis on economic 
growth. Per this model, economic growth is seen as a stabilization mechanism. However, the Achilles 
heel of cost externalization is that drifting polities would not be available ad infinitum. The socio-
political mass is constrained by the land resource. There are only a finite number of polities on the 
lattice. In the limit, the flow of drifting polities dries up, with the consequence of political fission. This 
dynamic explains the historical oscillation I have stylized earlier between societas and universitas.  
The stability of polycentricity arises from its ability to generate power internally. It does not need 
trade with external entities to generate neither wealth nor power. The power is generated by rotating the 
task of coordinating internal trade, for which an entity can obtain a wealth differential over the other 
polities in the pyramid. Given the expectation of zero power on the long-run (for all polities in the 
lattice), polities in the polycentric configuration would be happy to rotate the task of coordination.  
                                                          
133 Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy at 19.  
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However, if polycentric political structures are the most stable, how do we explain their scarcity 
historically? Due to the stability of polycentric structure, they tend to reduce the population of drifting 
polities, which, as discussed earlier, are essential for the stability of nation-states and universitas. Put 
differently, the ability of a polycentric union to generate all the wealth and power it needs internally 
means that its constituent polities would not be available for union with other polities. Moreover, a 
polycentric structure would be easier to attack by nation-states given the higher degree of sovereignty 
afforded to its members. This would suggest that while polycentricity is internally stable, it would still 
need constitutional guarantees to be sustainable.  
 
IV. TOWARDS AN ‘OLYMPIC’ WORLD SYSTEM 
 
The world needs to move to an Olympic future, as opposed to its current ‘World Cup’ (nation-state) 
model. In an Olympics, for example the upcoming Rio 2016, one city hosts a multitude of games. All 
games happening in one place, under the auspices of one city. The city becomes a showcase for the 
whole world. In a ‘World Cup’ instead, a whole nation organizes games for one sport across its 
geographic extent. In the case of the 2015 World Cup, England hosted the tournament in no less than 
eleven cities. The ‘World Cup’ model showcases a nation rather than a particular city. This future is 
largely predicated on the legal personality of cities.  
 
 
A. The Legal Personality of Cities 
 
In this section I take a closer look at the legal personality of cities throughout the past, up to the present 
day, and further beyond. By legal personality I mean the “device by which the law creates or recognizes 
units to which it ascribes certain powers and capacities”.134 Such units could either be natural human 
beings or artificial entities. In common law a legal person can include a body politic and a body 
corporate. The assertion in this section is that throughout history, cities oscillated between strong and 
weak personalities. The strong personalities dominated when higher orders of political organisation 
were undergoing crises, while the weak personalities dominated under the reverse conditions. To 
understand these different personalities better we need to take a detour to introduce, if only briefly, the 
legal theories behind them. These theories are usually discussed in the context of corporations, but apply 
equally to cities, especially in an analysis of international legal personality, as the latter continues to be 
understood as body corporate.135 Some theories focus on the question of the reality of city legal 
personality, while others focus on the source of legal personality. For our purposes the former theories 
are of particular interest, and two theories among these are most pertinent.  
Under the positivist ‘fiction theory’, championed by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, John Salmond, 
Edward Coke, and William Blackstone, the legal personality of the city is fictional. Nevertheless this 
personality is different from that of its inhabitants, which means that changes in the population would 
not alter the legal personality of the city. The property of the city is not in law the property of its 
                                                          
134 George Whitecross Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence at 393 (Oxford University Press 4th ed 1973). 
135 David P Derham, Theories of Legal Personality, in Legal Personality and Political Pluralism, ed. L. C. Webb (Melbourne University 
Press 1958); Mark M Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational Real Entity Theory, 50 (3) University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review 575 (1989); Friedrick Hallis, Corporate Personality: A Study of Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 1930); Jan Klabbers, 
The Concept of Legal Personality, 11 Ius Gentium 35 (2005); F. M. Maitland, Introduction to Gierke's Political Theories of the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge University Press 1900); Janne Elisabeth Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry into the History 
and Theory of International Law (TMC Asser Press 2004). 
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inhabitants. On the other hand, the ‘Realist Theory’, a natural rights theory that found favor with 
Johannes Althusius and Otto von Gierke, asserts that cities are ‘social organisms’ with real 
(psychological rather than physical) existence separate from its inhabitants. This later came to be known 
as the “Cooley-Eaton-McQuillin thesis” which denied “the existence of absolute state supremacy over 
cities”.136 The ‘realist’ theory accounts for the possibility of cities’ strong personality, while the ‘fiction’ 
theory suggests a weaker version.  
To give the analysis some informative structure, the status of cities is mapped along a two 
dimensional continuum of (1) economic independence, and (2) political independence. Together, 
economic and political independence represent a proxy for jurisdiction, i.e. “a government’s general 
power to exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory; especially, a state’s power 
to create interests that will be recognized under common-law principles as valid in other states”.137 
Hence cities are distinguished from towns and villages not by their size, but by possessing privileges of 
self-governance,138 nor did the size of a given city have any bearing on its importance or influence.139 
The city in essence participates consciously in the making of history.140 Or as put by Oswald Spengler, 
a city has a soul.141 According to Max Weber,142 the city ideal-type displays autonomous legal, 
economic and political systems were (small scale) democracy represents a viable alternative to (large 
scale) bureaucracy. This continuum reflects not only the fact that there are potentially as many legal 
personalities for cities as there are cities, but that there are different ideal types for different cities. To 
simplify the analysis further, without any loss of generality, the continuum is digitized into three 
models: the territorial city, the charter city, and the sovereign (fully autonomous) city. This analytical 
framework is shown in Figure 4.1. The success of cities under all three models depends more or less 
upon their ability to exercise control over their economic surplus.143  In fact there were chiefly three 
ways for cities to succeed in the international economic system of their time. Cities could either be trade 
sites, for example Troyes and Provins historically, and Singapore and Hong Kong in our time; or 
become powerful industrial exporters, for example the textile towns of Flanders, or today the oil-rich 
emirates of the Persian Gulf; or function as commercial shippers transferring goods between different 
markets, for example Genoa and Venice.144  
 
                                                          
136 Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 (6) Harvard Law Review 1113 (1980). 
137 Henry Campbell  Black, Black's Law Dictionary at 867, in Black's Law Dictionary ed. Bryan A Garner (editor in chief) (West Publishing 
2004). 
138 Christopher R. Friedrichs, The Swiss and German City-States, in The City-State in Five Cultures 109 ed. Robert Griffeth and Carol G. 
Thomas (ABC Clio 1981). 
139 At 124. 
140 Lewis Mumford, The City in Histroy: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects at 576 (Harcourt 1961). 
141 Oswald Spengler, The Soul of the City, in Classic Essays on the Culture of Cities 61 ed. Richard Sennett (Prentice-Hall 1969). 
142 Max Weber, The Nature of the City. 
143 Robert  Griffeth and Carol G.  Thomas, Five City-State Cultures Compared, in The City-State in Five Cultures 181 ed. Robert Griffeth 
and Carol G. Thomas (ABC Clio 1981). 
144 Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 at 129-30 (Oxfrod University Press 1989). 
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Figure 4.1: The analytical framework showing three types of cities 
 
In a clear departure from the historical trend where cities were created not by governments but by their 
own citizens, most legal systems today treat cities as creatures of state and statute (the Dillon doctrine); 
as implementation agencies of national and supra-national agendas. In most legal frameworks today, 
cities do not have any ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ powers.145 They are governed more as bureaucracies than 
democracies. For example, in the United States cities are treated as administrative subdivisions of their 
states.146 Unlike states, they are not “general lawmaking [sic] bodies”.147 Even though there has been 
attempts in the nineteenth and twentieth century to model American cities after European ‘free’ cities; 
when large American cities faced an urban crisis driven by unprecedented growth, they looked to the 
old continent for inspiration. Comparative analysis of the legal frameworks governing cities in the US 
and Europe resulted in constitutional amendments where many states granted their cities ‘home rule’,148 
although denied them planning powers commensurate to those seen in Europe, and hence the ‘home 
rule’ given to American cities did not alleviate the powerlessness of American cities. The most liberal 
plans for home rule reserved to the state power that would be most injurious to the city, such as police 
power and the power to regulate elections and local finances.149  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, in many jurisdictions but most notably in the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand, there was another central government intervention that saw local governments, especially 
metropolitan authorities, become even more powerless. Any political devolution focused almost 
exclusively on regional autonomy, such as in the case of Scotland.150 In Australia, local governments 
were reduced to property servicing functions, although economic pressures saw larger units of 
government through amalgamation. The same mega city amalgamations can also be seen in Canada and 
New Zealand.151  
Current local government law envisages state administrative control over city-regions regardless of 
their varying capacities and competencies. For example, local government law in the United States 
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simply decentralizes power by moving its location without reshaping the nature of the relationship 
between central and local governments.152 To be precise, there has been real limits to local (financial) 
autonomy as evidenced by increasing fiscal dependence on central governments and less policy 
discretion over resources.153 The legal conception today is that “cities are governmental bodies with 
delegated powers created and limited by the authority of state governments”.154 Cities have only powers 
delegated to them by state governments, and even these powers have traditionally been severely limited 
by the courts. In fact the US Supreme Court has excessively emphasized the absolute power states have 
over cities.  The rationale for this approach stems from two main arguments. The first enlists the 
complexity of today’s world, with its large scale organizations, to evidence the impossibility of 
decentralizing power to cities. A related second argument sets up the sovereign city as a selfish entity 
that cannot be trusted to exercise unsupervised power. City power is feared for it strangles capitalism 
by a maze of local regulations and frustrates national political objectives by parochial agendas. City 
discretion invokes images of corruption and even foolishness. Both arguments allude to a necessity of 
the powerlessness of cities—a necessity whom Tocqueville, Marx and Hegel identified as a cornerstone 
of government policies in the democratic era.155  
Both of these arguments are flawed. The first for misunderstanding the nature of complexity.156 The 
second for conflating the concept of legal empowerment (as a form of bounded autonomy) with that of 
sovereignty.157 Increasing people’s control over their lives is not tantamount to prohibiting interference 
from other stakeholders. This conflation harks back to an already archaic formulation of sovereignty 
where it only exhibits an abstract absolute, or to a formulation that envisages only a division of 
sovereignty (as under federalism), rather than a sharing of sovereignty (as under subsidiarity). As I 
discuss elsewhere,158 sovereignty is a relational construct that envisages sharing sovereignty, which in 
turn imports organizing jurisdictions on a small scale. On the other hand, ensuring city-regions are the 
primary unit of political organisation also forces cities to take regional considerations into account.   
It was liberalism that brought about the current powerlessness of cities. Liberalism, with its model 
of the world as dualities, saw participatory democracy on a small scale like the city-region as 
unworkable. Cities with real power were intermediate structures between the state and the individual. 
Through legal doctrine, liberalism proceeded to eliminate this intermediate structure and replace it with 
powerless, coercive instruments of the state.159  
The archipelago analogy applies not only to countries such as Australia,160 but more generally to all 
‘world systems’, where ‘world cities’ (privileged cities that have a global economic status driven by 
innovation) steer political and economic processes on a global scale.161 World systems theory is a 
multidisciplinary approach where the analysis of economic, social and political change is based on an 
archipelago of ‘world cities’ rather than the nation-states existing at any given time.162 The ‘world cities’ 
hypothesis was introduced by John Friedmann in the 1980s where he argued that cities articulate larger 
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regional, national, and international economies.163 The hypothesis represents the political economy of 
the global urban system.164 World cities are large, urbanized regions that are defined by dense patterns 
of interaction rather than by political-administrative boundaries. The ‘connectivity’ we see today 
between ‘world cities’ under processes of globalization has been the norm under ‘world systems’ 
throughout history. For example, the world system that existed between 1250 and 1350 was an 
archipelago of ‘world cities’.165 An earlier example at the beginning of the Common Era was the system 
where cities in the Roman Empire, the Han Empire, and India dominated world commerce, although 
this system had a much lower level of interaction between these constituent parts. An important insight 
from this world system archipelago is its cyclical emergence and collapse, largely through fluctuations 
in population levels (due to pandemics, wars, or even ‘social engineering’) where emphasis swings 
between rural and urban centers, or between immigrant and indigenous populations. World systems rise 
when economic integration increases, sometimes driven by military might, and collapse when 
connections along older pathways increase, although collapse does not necessarily return the world to 
the status quo ante.  
In 1915 one scholar commenting on the unsatisfactory governance structures for cities within US 
states was inspired by the German federal system to ask the following question: “Why should we not 
look forward to the entire separation of metropolitan cities such as New York, Chicago, and 
Philadelphia from state ties, and their erection into free city commonwealths within our federal 
system?” adding that “Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck … are splendid examples of municipal progress 
and self-development in freedom”.166 While his proposal would have been deemed unconstitutional if 
only because it would have been perceived to advocate secession, the real issue—not addressed by this 
scholar, is how to design a governance structure that would pave the way to such a reality.  
City power is again on the ascendancy. Today we can discern a move towards empowering cities on 
two fronts: one is domestic where there is constitutional recognition, under cooperative models of 
federalism, of the local governments of city-regions as co-equal to federal and state governments, and 
the development of what is known as the ‘doctrine of usurpation of jurisdiction’.167 The approach does 
not emphasize political autonomy but rather the idea of subsidiarity where general competence powers 
are extended to city-regions.168  The second front is international, where there is an emerging field of 
law that acknowledges city-regions as independent international actors. To be sure, international law 
has long had an indirect impact on cities, but now we see an emerging trend where cities are becoming 
distinct international actors almost co-equal to their nation-states. International law is enlarging the 
nation-state club that dominated its institutions since their emergence, to admit sub-national governance 
structures, most notably city-regions, mainly through regulating the relationship between cities and their 
nation-states.  
The traditional approach for creating legal frameworks to govern city-regions, namely local 
government law, has been through domestic instruments. The main objective of such rules, under the 
classic doctrine of state responsibility, was to prevent exposing (sovereign) nation-states to liability 
under international law for the conduct of their sub-national governments that are not directly obligated 
to comply with international law. Traditionally, international law bestowed a legal personality only on 
sovereign nation-states (with a few exceptions). A key requirement for recognition being that the 
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political entity has no government above it. This resulted in strict domestic regulation of sub-national 
governments.169  
The traditional approach where local government is simply an administrative division of the state is 
now being replaced by an approach, driven largely by globalization (as a modality of economic 
integration), where international institutions redefine the scope of domestic frameworks. This has come 
to be known as ‘International Local Government Law’, a hitherto uncodified interdisciplinary field that 
draws on comparative urban governance (which focuses on domestic rules) as well as on the ‘world 
cities’ hypothesis which highlights the impact of economic forces in shaping ‘world systems’.170  Unlike 
these other disciplines, however, international local government law emphasizes the dual legal nature 
of city-regions as both sub-national governments and as independent international actors. This emerging 
field would determine both, who should regulate the legal framework for city-regions, and the nature 
of that framework. Examples of this approach include decisions by international arbitration tribunals 
regulating cities’ land use. This international framework envisages (at least tentatively) empowering 
cities “principally as a mechanism for promoting private economic development”.171 
International instruments such as the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
inter alia, are altering the relationship between cities and nation-states. City-regions are becoming 
“nodal points for radially distinct governance projects that have their common goal to transform cities 
from mere subdivisions of sovereign states into legally empowered entities, able to advance goals and 
values that are different from their states”.172  
 
 
B. Amalgamation and Economic Growth 
 
A stepping stone for understanding the correlation between economic growth and city governance 
structures generally, is amalgamation. Quigley discusses the economic factors provided by cities.173 
These could be divided into scale economies (e.g. larger plant sizes and larger parks and libraries), 
shared inputs (e.g. legal and accounting services and recreational facilities including theatres and 
restaurants), transaction costs (e.g. matching in labor markets, and in large shopping malls), and 
statistical economies (e.g. lower unemployment and lower inventory levels). The seminal work by 
Fujita et al identifies both centripetal and centrifugal forces of economic activity arising from 
agglomeration,174 and work by David Maré distinguishing between the effects of localization which 
refers to congregations of similar firms, and urbanization which refers to diversity (congregations of 
different firms).175 These effects however could and usually do work simultaneously in a given locale.   
While amalgamation does not necessarily lead to innovation, there is a large body of literature that 
looks specifically at the role of cities in innovation. Notwithstanding, a relatively recent review 
concludes that the literature is not definitive, in particular due to definitional issues around cities and 
innovation.176 Such problems could be attenuated by focusing on a subset of cities, i.e. charter cities. 
Focusing on subsets of innovation could also be informative. The difficulty is that charter cities are an 
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‘ideal type’. However, we can use a proxy construct, namely polycentricity,177 as it applies to existing 
levels of governance, and extrapolate its effect on innovation to that of charter cities. For example, in 
the context of the United States, Derek Kauneckis shown that an increasingly proactive role for the 
states in setting the research agenda (as opposed to being implementation instruments of a national 
research agenda) is having positive effects on innovation.178 
More broadly, we need to invoke an analogy between charter cities and competitive markets. The 
latter, as Adam Smith reminds us, align the interests of private and public agents. In particular, charter 
cities allows for the creation of competing legal systems. Under this analogy, we find evidence of 
innovation being enhanced by the existence of competitive markets (inter-charter cities). For example, 
Elinor Ostrom, citing W. Ross Ashby, argues that “any governance system that is designed to regulate 
complex biological systems [such as cities] must have as much variety in the actions that it can take as 
there exists in the systems being regulated.”179 Ostrom elaborates that “[a]mong the institutions that 
humans utilize for generating highly desirable future goods are open, competitive markets. [These 
markets] … create incentives for innovation and entrepreneurship.”180 This competition becomes more 
difficult when public goods are offered, but not impossible. Provided voters have perfect mobility and 
perfect information, they will move from one city (local community) to another which maximizes their 
personal utility.181 Allowing cities to differentiate their public good bundles allows not only for 
efficiency gains, but also for innovation to attract more residents. 
Besides governance structures, there are other factors affecting the economic performance of cities. 
The scholarship of Michael Storper is useful here.182 Storper identifies institutions as such factors. While 
institutions include legal systems, they go beyond. They include firms, markets, and social conventions. 
Michael porter joins in the emphasis on innovation, in particular in the performance of regions (mainly 
172 Economic Areas as defined by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis). He also emphasizes the role 
of (trade industry) clusters.183 This chimes with Putnam who emphasizes culture as a predictor of 
economic development (Putnam, Leonardi & Nonetti 1994; Putnam 2000).184 Putnam made the 
conjecture that social capital is a function of autonomous governance at the local level, especially as 
exemplified by free city-states in the Middle Ages.185  
Another insight comes from the literature on the resilience of regional and local economies to 
recessions. For example, Martin et al suggest a complex array of factors.186 These include industrial and 
business structure (e.g. firm size and ownership, debt structure and financial strength, supply chains), 
financial arrangements with national governments, equity market conditions, and labor market 
conditions (e.g. skill profiles, gender profile, mobility). Martin et al also identify governance structures 
as one of the factors of resilience, including national and local policies, and international regulatory 
arrangements.  
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C. The Economic Case for Charter Cities 
 
Economic rationale plays a major part in informing our federal designs. To get the choices right, we 
need to mull over, if only briefly, the basis of this economic rationale. The following propositions are 
intended to achieve the same: 
 
(1) Richest countries are economically more complex: Economic prosperity is related to economic 
complexity, especially as measured by the Economic Complexity Index (ECI). In this ranking, Australia 
came in at 79 out of 86 ranked countries, below Chile and above Zimbabwe.187 The United Kingdom 
was ranked at 11, the United States at 13, Canada at 41, and New Zealand at 48. Even countries that are 
perceived to be completely dependent on fossil fuels were ranked higher than Australia. Norway for 
example came in at 33, while Saudi Arabia at 68. 188 
It is submitted that ‘fixing the federalism’ requires a federal design that enables the creation of 
competitive products and services. This leads directly to the primacy of innovation. 
 
(2) Complex economies require ‘world cities’: World cities are the nuclei of innovation worldwide.189 
The Innovation Cities Global Index (ICGI) measures the potential of cities as innovation economies, 
and ranks 500 cities worldwide on innovation.190 In the 2014 version, the top five cities were (in 
descending order): San Francisco, New York, London, Boston, and Paris. The top five complex 
economies (from the ECI) had the following cities in the top 100: Japan (Tokyo 15, Kyoto 34, Osaka 
37, Kobe 61, and Fukuoka 88); Germany (Munich 7, Berlin 13, Hamburg 18, Stuttgart 22, Frankfurt 
30, Leipzig 33, Düsseldorf 43, Cologne 53, Dresden 72, Karlsruhe 75, Hannover 79); Switzerland 
(Zürich 59, Geneva 73); Sweden (Stockholm 16); and Austria (Vienna 6). In the 2015 version, the top 
five cities were London, San Francisco, Vienna, Boston and Seoul. The top five complex economies 
had the following cities: Japan (Tokyo 10, Osaka 32, Kyoto 36, Kobe 66, and Fukuoka 106); Germany 
(Munich 12, Berlin 14, Stuttgart 24, Hamburg 31, Leipzig 34, Frankfurt 37, Düsseldorf 55, Cologne 59, 
Karlsruhe 80, Dresden 89, Hannover 92); Switzerland (Zürich 72, Geneva 82); Sweden (Stockholm 
17); and Austria (Vienna 3).  
These indicators point to the fact that constitutional designs need to produce the type of cities that 
can take the lead on innovation.  
 
 
(3) Empowering cities leads to ‘world city’ status: Constitutional designs need to: (1) empower 
existing cities, and (2) create new (charter) cities. The best definition of empowerment is provided by 
what is known as a ‘global city’, namely a city that has a direct effect on global affairs.191 Such cities 
exhibit a level of infrastructure concentration that enables them to influence global processes.192 Such 
cities function as the “organizing nodes of a global economic system”,193 defined by dense patterns of 
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interaction between people, goods, and information.194 Such cities are linked in a single network,195 
sometimes referred to as a ‘world system’, which sharpens the competition between them.196 The spatial 
dispersion of economic activities and global integration has contributed to the strategic role of these 
cities in the current world system.197 
The Globalization and World Cities Research (GaWC) Network provides one of the oldest rankings 
of such cities.198 Looking at the United Kingdom we find London (Alpha ++), Manchester (Beta), 
Birmingham and Edinburgh (Beta -), Bristol (Gamma +), and Glasgow and Belfast (Gamma). On the 
other hand, the United States has New York City (Alpha ++), Chicago and Los Angeles (Alpha), San 
Francisco, Washington DC, Miami, Boston, and Atlanta (Alpha -), Dallas, Philadelphia and Houston 
(Beta +), Minneapolis, Cleveland, Seattle, Detroit, Denver, San Diego (Beta -), Baltimore, St Louis, 
Charlotte, Tampa (Gamma +), San Juan, Raleigh, San Jose, Cincinnati, Milwaukee (Gamma), and 
Columbus, Orlando, Kansas City, and Portland (Gamma -). Canada however fairs even worse than 
Australia with only three cities making the rankings: Toronto (Alpha), Montreal (Beta +), and Calgary 
(Beta -). 
The diagnosis is probably more persuasive when we compare the United States to China. The two 
countries have relatively the same total area, which is of continental proportions, but China has three 
times the population in the US. Notwithstanding, China has only two Alpha + cities (Shanghai and 
Beijing), one Beta + (Guangzhou), one Beta – (Shenzhen), and one Gamma – (Tianjin). We can also 
add Hong Kong (Alpha +). In total the United States has thirty cities ranked Gamma and above, to 
China’s six (including Hong Kong). This is the main indicator of the relative power between the US 
and China. In a nutshell, “The main phases in the economic development of the United States are clearly 
reflected in the growth of its great cities”.199  
At first glance there seems to be very little in common between ‘Alpa’ cities. This requires a 
delineation of how the GaWC model ranks cities. The model is a city-centric flow model, as opposed 
to one based on the boundaries of nation-states. It ranks cities based on their ‘advanced producer 
services’, using an interlocking network model.200 These ‘advanced producer services’ include 
accounting, advertising, finance, insurance, and law applied in transnational contexts. In particular, the 
model interprets cities as being nodes, but not as primary actors. The model evaluates the presence of 
‘advanced producer service’ firms in cities, and this size of this presence.201 
In the words of Saskia Sassen,202 these cities have “a particular component in their economic base” 
which gives them a ‘specific role in the current phase of the world economy’. The model uses indirect 
measures of flows to compute a city’s network connectivity, which is a measure of a city’s integration 
into the world city network. These connectivity measures are then used to classify cities into levels of 
world city network integration, as follows: 
 
 Alpha++ cities stand out as clearly more integrated than all other cities and constitute their own 
high level of integration.  
 Alpha+ cities are highly integrated cities that complement Alpha ++ cities, largely filling in 
advanced service needs for the Pacific Asia.  
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 Alpha & alpha- cities are very important world cities that link major economic regions and states 
into the world economy. 
There are also Beta level cities, which are instrumental in linking their region or state into the world 
economy, and Gamma cities that either link smaller regions or states into the world economy, or world 
cities whose major global capacity is not in advanced producer services.  
But Alpha cities function within national jurisdiction frameworks. Why would we require charter 
cities? From a historical perspective, nation-states are not necessary for the creation of Alpha cities. 
Probably, the Hanseatic League is the quintessential example.203 Historically, territorial states were the 
Leagues nemesis. From the sixteenth century, and the ascendancy of the Westphalian model of 
sovereignty, leading to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the League succumbed to the political authority 
of ‘national’ states. The last formal meeting of the League taking place in 1669.204  
Second, Alpha cities used to function within national jurisdiction frameworks. This is no more the 
case. The contemporary city is no more ‘installed’ in a territory.  The city is diverging from its historical 
model as part of a larger ‘national’ framework. Today, cities are about the flows (of activities made in 
the world and hence perennially on the move, of non-resident, migrant population) that seem to be 
exponentially growing in all directions. Paolo Perulli illustrates the point with statistics on the number 
of migrants worldwide, and how they concentrate in global cities.205 Global cities are transcending the 
limitations imposed by the nation-state and its constructs of citizenship and sovereignty. Ideas such as 
the ‘fatherland’ and ‘our county’ are being replaced by consideration almost exclusively of economic 
nature.  
Third, cities such as Singapore and Hong Kong are classified as Alpha + cities, and share a specific 
characteristic. They did not need to go through the long evolutionary path of other Alpha + cities like 
Paris and Beijing. They achieved their status within one or maybe two generations. Notwithstanding, 
all Alpha + cities enjoyed (and some continue to enjoy) a clear privileged position: that of the capital 
city. Both Sydney and Dubai are capitals of their states. A key fact to highlight from the GaWC ranking 
is the very high scores that many city-states have achieved: Hong Kong, Singapore, and Dubai (Alpha 
+). In the next proposition, this is analyzed further to ascertain the type of empowerment that could lead 
to global cities. 
  
(4) The principle of subsidiarity empowers cities: In 2013, Benjamin Barber, an eminent American 
political scientist, argued that cities can save the world from a deepening crisis of democracy where the 
nation-state is failing to perform both on the local and global scales.206 He advocates a world where 
“cities, the most networked and interconnected of our political associations, defined above all by 
collaboration and pragmatism, by creativity and multiculture, do what states cannot” (Barber 2013, p. 
4).207 Barber’s vision is being advocated by global organizations such as the United Cities and Local 
Governments network,208 which in 2010 called for cities to be self-governed (UCLG 2010); and the 
Cities Alliance, launched in 1999 by the World Bank and the United Nations Human Settlements 
Program (UN-Habitat) as a global partnership to promote the role of cities in sustainable 
development.209 
The principle of subsidiarity could provide the mechanism to fulfil the vision shared by Barber, the 
UCLG, and the Cities Alliance. The approach is not too remote from the one espoused on charter cities, 
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nor does it fall far from what was proposed by Baruch Spinoza in the seventeenth century in his analysis 
of the Dutch Federation that existed between 1581 and 1795.210 
 
In 2009, Paul Romer promoted the idea of creating charter cities in developing countries.211 The idea is 
inspired by cities such as Hong Kong and Shenzhen.212 This Charter Cities Initiative is currently part of 
the NYU Urbanization Project.213 According to Romer, a charter city is a special type of ‘special zone’. 
In particular,214  
 
First, a Charter City has to be big. Viable cities will have millions of residents, so a zone has to 
be big to accommodate them. Second, it should be a Reform Zone, not a Concession Zone. Most 
zones are created to offer concessions to firms, not to implement reforms. The goal of a Charter 
City is reform, not giving out concessions, so in this sense, the motivation for a Charter City is 
totally different from the motivation behind most special zones.  
 
Here are my two tests for whether a policy is a reform or a concession: Would you be happy if 
this policy lasts forever? Would you be happy if this policy spread to the entire country? If the 
answer to both questions is yes, it is a reform. If not, it is almost surely a concession, a gift to 
some special interest. A reform zone is a zone that implements one or more fundamental reforms. 
 
So to summarize, a Charter City is a city-scale reform zone where a startup city could emerge. 
 
Romer also suggests charter cities for the United States:215  
Take the United States, for example. If someone wanted to start a Charter City there, what might 
they do? One possibility might be to develop a new city that from the beginning requires that 
every vehicle be autonomous, that is computer-controlled … You could also use software to 
prioritize emergency service vehicles instead of sirens. This sounds like a small advantage, but 
in New York City, the number one complaint on the city’s 311 line is noise. Noise pollution 
seriously reduces the quality of modern life. It may even have important effects on health. It is 
the kind of problem that we tend to accept as being inevitable, but which the right kind of 
innovation could address. But the kind of innovation that is required might not be possible for an 
individual firm. For something like emergency service vehicles, it might take innovation at the 
level of the entire city. 
 
 
D. Charter Cities and the Democratic Ideal 
 
Next, I continue my analysis by investigating the link between the size of polities and democracy.  
The most important output that democracy produces is evolutionary fitness where democratic 
societies are more effective in dealing with their problems and more able to adapt to the environment. 
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The Greek city-states survival for thousands of years is a testament to this proposition. When we 
interpret democracy as an evolutionary fitness trait, it becomes synonymous with voluntary cooperation. 
It is a short distance from that position to where we can see that democracy favors small scale 
organization. Voluntary cooperation is linked to the idea of political trust. Political trust is a complex 
concept which is “a form of fiduciary trust between society and government … which is inherently 
different from mutual trust between people”.216 In the context of municipal government there is 
empirical evidence that “trust in local officeholders is typically and often considerably higher than trust 
in national politicians” and that the “size of a municipality has a modest negative effect on political 
trust”.217  
We can see this link between democracy and evolutionary fitness in Dahl and Tufte (albeit 
indirectly) where they suggest that in the two traditions of locating democracy in the city-state and in 
the nation-state the ideal polity would satisfy at least the following two dimensions (of democracy):218  
the dimension of “citizen effectiveness” and the dimension of “system capacity”. On citizen 
effectiveness, Dahl and Tufte conclude that there is a trade-off between two different aspects of 
effectiveness: the cost of participation and the cost of dissent. They present the conclusion in a figure 
which we reproduce with minor modifications as Figure 4.2 below.219 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Trade-off on citizen effectiveness as presented by Dahl and Tufte 
 
 
However, Dahl and Tufte do not suggest the existence of an optimal size. This is due to the demands 
of the other dimension of democracy (in the ideal polity), namely “system capacity”. They argue that 
“the criterion of system capacity makes small systems too costly for many purposes and thus leads to 
the need for many systems … the criterion of system capacity implies that in the present world there is 
no single optimum size for democratic policies”.220  
The reason why Dahl and Tufte were not able to see an optimal scale is the use of “system capacity” 
as a second dimension independent of citizens’ effectiveness. In order for us to see why this approach 
muddies the scale calculus involved, we turn to what is known in biology as the Allee Effect after the 
“Chicago school” ecologist Warder Clyde Allee who recognized a positive correlation between 
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population size and the mean individual fitness of a population or species.221 More generally, “group 
size effects, sometimes called group augmentation, can promote the evolution of helping and other 
forms of complex cooperation, in some circumstances in the absence of relatedness”.222 The Allee Effect 
can be depicted as shown in Figure 4.3. 223   
For example, vigilance as an individual evolutionary trait would give rise to the component effect 
(in Figure 4.3). Other examples of component effects are cooperative hunting and the ability to find 
mates more easily. At low population density, these component effects produce an overall demographic 
effect. The demographic effect however depends on negative density-dependent effects such as 
interference and depletion. As population density becomes high, negative density dependence depletes 
the demographic effect by offsetting the component effects e.g. through resource competition.224 In 
other words, as the size (population) increases there will often be a reduction in the fitness of 
individuals. However, “[a]t low numbers or densities, the benefits from the addition of each successive 
individual outweigh the costs, such that there is a net gain in individual fitness, and fitness is highest at 
intermediate numbers of densities”.225  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Trade-off between component and demographic effects in the Allee Effect 
 
 
The similarity between Figures 4.2 and 4.3 should be clear. The component effect corresponds to 
the cost of dissent while the demographic effect corresponds to the cost of participation (thinking of 
evolutionary fitness as a benefit equal to one minus the cost). We can reasonably conclude that 
democracy’s citizens’ effectiveness dimension corresponds to the evolutionary fitness trade-off as 
illustrated in the Allee Effect. This does not however give any indication as to the role of the second 
dimension of democracy as identified by Dahl and Tufte, namely “system capacity”. Although from 
this evolutionary perspective, we can interpret Dahl and Tufte’s “system capacity” dimension, which 
represents a polity’s ability to “manipulate and to adapt to its environment”,226 as corresponding to the 
resultant evolutionary fitness from the trade-off inherent in the Allee Effect. To further illuminate this 
                                                          
221 James T. Costa, The Other Insect Societies at 19 (Harvard University Press 2006).  
222 At 37.  
223 See W. C.  Allee, Animal Aggressions (University of Chicago Press 1931); W. C. Allee, The Social Life of Animals (William Heinemann  
1938). For an introduction to the Allee Effect see P. A. Stephens, W. J. Sutherland, and R. P. Freckleton, What Is the Allee Effect?, 87 (1) 
Oikos 185 (1999). 
224 A. M. Kramer et al., The Evidence for Allee Effects, 51 (3) Population Ecology 341 (2009). 
225 Stephens, Sutherland, and Freckleton,What Is the Allee Effect? at 186.  
226 Dahl and Tufte, Size and Democracy at 110.  
 
 
28 
 
proposition, the next step is to look at how this democracy has been implemented in societies other than 
human ones.  
A primary candidate for such analogy would be social insects. Social insects happen to “exhibit the 
ultimate superorganism states, where inter-individual conflict within the colony is minimal or non-
existent”.227 Linking this to Dahl and Tufte observation that conflict is much less frequent in smaller 
systems,228 we can start to see why the evolutionary aspect of democracy would favor smaller polities. 
However, this observation also finds support from the implication of the idea of superorganism, in 
particular the ramifications of the concept of self-organization which produces the organisation seen in 
social insects (and other complex [adaptive] systems).229 This self-organization is based on the principle 
of unconscious cooperation which “is one of the basic principles of biology”.230 Note the resemblance 
of the self-organization concept to Dahl and Tufte’s second dimension of democracy, “system 
capacity”, where the polity is able solve its problems and to adopt and adapt to its environment. In 
particular, it is the observation that self-organization favors decentralization that we want to better 
understand. Self-organization does not require a “leader” that has to assimilate all available information 
before making a decision. Self-organization makes the decision making process reliant on actions taken 
by agents locally.231  
It is the idea of division of labor that explains why self-organization does not need centralization. 
Division of labor is based on the idea of cooperation where members of a given group divide their labor 
such that they all become dependent on one another for their survival. In particular, division of labor 
allows for the creation of more complex, and hence larger group sizes. In social insects, the most 
socially sophisticated groups are correlated with the largest colony sizes.232 In fact, Dahl and Tufte find 
evidence that the larger the country, the more decentralized its government.233 They measure 
centralization as the relative size of central government to all governments. Such proliferation of 
subunits would lead to higher complexity in the policy-making process. Decentralization is linked to 
the very nature of complexity, where the non-linearity of interactions leads to non-predictability that 
necessitates self-organization, where local interactions produce global behavior.234  
 
In the complex polity, the ability to respond to citizens’ preferences is a function of the interrelatedness 
or connectivity of the units constituting the complex polity. It follows that these units would not be fully 
autonomous. Sovereignty is shared by these units in the complex polity, as envisaged by polycentricity 
(subsidiarity).  
On the other hand, the understanding of democracy as evolutionary fitness brings sustainability into 
the picture. The question of democracy and size becomes a query about the sustainability of complex 
societies.235 Joseph Tainter finds that historically increasing complexity has limited the “system 
capacity” of societies to resolve their problems and to adapt to their environment.236 This is an argument 
of diminishing returns to complexity. For Tainter “[w]hat is perhaps most intriguing in the evolution of 
human societies is the regularity with which the pattern of increasing complexity is interrupted by 
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collapse―by episodes when societies change rapidly to a lower level of complexity”.237 In other words, 
“the society ‘decomposes’ as people pursue their own immediate goals rather than the long-term goals 
of the society’s leaders”.238 This is essence of self-organizing as discussed above. Although Tainter 
does not use the term self-organizing, he correctly identifies higher complexity with self-organization 
and the ensuing decentralization of decision making.  
Tainter’s depiction of complex societies is one where there is either resistance to self-organization, 
which leads to collapse (Tainter provides the example of the Roman Empire for this outcome), or where 
self-organization is enabled (which Tainter sees as leading to simplification), hence evading potential 
collapse (Tainter gives the example of Byzantine Empire for this outcome). A better way to understand 
the difference is to think of two types of complexity: one based on hierarchical organization, the other 
based on rhizomatical organization.239 Rhizomatical causality is not chronological and does not look at 
the origin of things (inputs) but rather at their conclusions (outputs). In relation to democracy, 
rhizomatical causality would look at outputs such as happiness, rule of law, and economic growth, 
rather than the inputs of electoral processes and civil rights. A rhizomatical interpretation of polities 
favors a non-hierarchical polity based on non-linear self-organization and decentralization.  
Growing degrees of economic integration (globalization) and the ensuing modulation of local-global 
power relations is putting more emphasis than ever before on clarifying our understanding of the 
democratic ideal and its operation from within the nation-state. In fact, some argue that “globalization 
is the self-organizing process of constructing a world socio-economic community”.240 This level of 
economic integration is resulting from a paradigm shift away from the “international model” and to a 
“transnational model”.241  
We know today that to cope with increasing environmental complexity, there needs to be a move 
away from pure hierarchical organization, and towards growing degrees of self-organization. The above 
excerpt provides one way of looking at the transition. Another way of explaining the same transition is 
the concept of the Rhizome (introduce above) where there is a move away from hierarchical 
organization and into network structures that are again based on self-organization and decentralization.   
 
V. CASE STUDY: AN ‘OLYMPIC’ MIDDLE EAST 
The Middle East as a geopolitical, or even an analytical, ‘concept’ has become too problematic. The so-
called ‘Arab Spring’, the on-going civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, the on-going conflict 
between Israel and the Palestinians, the Sunni-Shiite conflict, and the conflict between Turkey and the 
Kurds, attest to this proposition. The historical annals all the way back to Ur, can only furnish further 
affirmation. Prophylactic constitutional orders in the spirit of Spinoza’s understanding of sovereignty 
are therefore proposed as an alternative. This vision necessitates international treaties to underwrite 
charter cities as the dominant governance structure. Sovereignty, as envisaged by Spinoza, is the key 
proposition for peace in the Middle East, given this sovereignty’s subsidiarity between different 
organisational scales (the local, national, and global). The Middle East is composed of a rich mosaic of 
religions and ethnicities that is especially amenable to such orders. A lasting peace in the Middle East 
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requires relinquishing the nation-state model in favor of small, non-contiguous, jurisdictions connected 
in loose confederal structures. Syria and Iraq are ideal for implementing this new subsidiarity approach.  
In a place like the Middle East, with its rich mosaic of cultures, religions and ethnicities, the nation 
model will always be problematic, even if at a scale similar to that of Bahrain (less than 1000 square 
kilometers). I hence argue for governance structures based on autonomous cities.  
 
Next I briefly discuss the mosaic nature of the Middle East and outline the proposed strategies. Later, I 
delineate these strategies, especially the introducing the principle of subsidiarity and the concept of 
charter cities.  
 
A. The Tension induced by the Middle East Mosaic 
 
Culturally, the Middle East is one of the richest regions in the world. This cradle of civilization 
continues to be home to ethnicities as diverse as Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Azeris, Circassians, 
Copts, Druze, Jews, Persians, Kurds, Maronites, Turks, and other denominations form less significant 
minorities.242 The region is also home to many religions, including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and 
smaller religions such as the Baha’i Faith, Druze, Yezidism, and Zoroastrianism.243 This does not mean 
that the region cannot be analyzed as a ‘cultural area’,244 but accentuates the complexity inherent therein. 
This beautiful diversity, the signifier of evolution over millennia, is however consistently under threat 
due to geopolitical frictions, most notably from the large polities in the regions, and/or the relatively 
small size of many of these ethnicities and religions. The norm in this region is for such diversity to be 
grouped into political states, dominated by the largest ethnicities and religions, which in turn results in 
tensions that threat the stability of the region.  
We have seen a trend towards relieving some of this tension since WW I, more often than not 
unsuccessfully, as seen in Lebanon and its consociational system. There, the distribution of power based 
on the 1932 religion consensus was not able to provide a sustainable solution.245 Another case in point 
is Turkey, which went through a process of ‘sorting’ though the Turkish War of Liberation (1919 to 
1922), and the Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne. The mosaic of different nationalities that existed in the 
Ottoman Empire, and acknowledged by the Treaty of Sèvres of August 20, 1920, was now being 
replaced by a combination of community annihilation or expulsion. The Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 
1923 formalizes this approach. While The Treaty of Sèvres was described by one author as “fragile as 
the porcelain of that name, though lacking its charm”, this treaty was more sensitive to the mosaic 
makeup of the Middle East at the time.246 The main issue for Turkey with the Treaty of Sèvres was the 
system of Capitulations, which was abolished by the Turks in 1914, but re-imposed under the Treaty of 
Sèvres. This system removed Turkey’s jurisdiction over foreigners living within its borders.  
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The Middle East continues to be a cultural mosaic, which in turn continues to cause tensions. The 
recent execution of Shia Sheikh al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia makes the ongoing civil wars in Syria, Yemen 
and Iraq only the tip of the iceberg representing this tension.247  
 
B. Prophylactic Intervention (1): Continental Differentiation 
 
The first proposed strategy is to ensure a ‘détente’ in the Middle East by systematically reorient the 
cultural, social and political compass of some parts of the Middle East towards Africa.  This creates a 
continental ‘envelope’, a universitas, where we can establish free charter cities. The idea is to stablish 
charter cities across this ‘greater Africa’ as the architectural foundation for a loose confederation or 
confederations across the continent. In order for charter cities to thrive, they need to trade with each 
other. Providing a ‘continental envelope’ not only allows for this cooperation, but also for viable defense 
mechanisms given the large number of cities involved.   
For my purposes I adopt a traditional definition of the Middle East, where there are six 
subregions:(1) Asia minor (Turkey and Cyprus), (2) Persia (Iran), (3) the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Israel, 
Palestine, and Jordan), (4) Mesopotamia (Iraq), (5) the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, and Oman), and (5) Egypt. The proposition is to reclassify these 
subregions as parts of three different continents, and by doing so ‘dissolve’ the Middle East, at least as 
an analytical framework, into three parts: (I) the European part: Asia Minor, (II) the Asian part: Persia, 
(III) the African part: Egypt, the Levant, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian Peninsula. Hence, in contrast 
to the current classification that sees the Levant, Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula as part of 
South-West Asia, these parts become incorporated into North-East Africa.  
The proposition is that the Levant, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian Peninsula would benefit from a 
reorientation away from Asia. As a long-term strategy, this would see a drifting away from the 
influences exerted by Turkey and Iran on these countries. It would be of course naïve to believe that 
Turkey and Iran would cease to interfere in the affairs of these countries simply because they are 
classified as African rather than European or Asian. But the argument is an evolutionary one. The 
proposition is that over time Africa would become more important to the political and economic 
strategies of these countries, where African heavyweights such as South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria 
counterbalance the influences exerted by Turkey and Iran.  
This approach is no stranger to the long history of these countries. Both Hebrews and Arabs have 
strong ties with North and East Africa. The story of the Exodus is in one sense an affirmation of the 
influences flowing between the Levant and Egypt.248 Even the nascent religion of Islam provides 
insights into the first point of secure for the Arabian Peninsula. To be precise, it was Ethiopia that was 
the first port of call for Prophet Mohammed and his followers.249  
This strategy would virtually see a ‘dissolution’ of the Middle East as an analytical entity. Now there 
would be three different platforms for analysis: the European platform with issues relating to Turkey 
and its integration into the European Union, the Asian platform where Iran becomes part of a “greater 
Indian subcontinent’ (which also includes Afghanistan). The third platform would see the rest of the 
Middle East joining north-east Africa. 
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This ‘neuausrichtung’ would see these parts of the Middle East join African organizations ranging 
from political organizations such as the African Union, to cultural and sports organizations such as the 
Confederation of African Football. The forging of these formal ties with Africa would provide a 
symbiosis in labor markets where supply and demand for labor are matched through immigration and 
direct foreign investment. More importantly, Africa provides a huge military depth, both in numbers 
(for example from Nigeria) and know-how (especially from South Africa), beyond the role played by 
Egypt.  
C. Prophylactic Intervention (2): Sovereignty à la Spinoza 
 
My relational definition of sovereignty imports a small scale organisation of the state. Without any 
constitutional safeguards in place, this relational basis continues to fray as sovereignty, predominantly 
through its economic rationale, amplifies the jurisdictional footprint of the state. As has been outlined 
earlier, historically, sovereignty succumbed to the concept of ‘nation’ through the pedigree of political 
economy and the economic basis thereof. This national sovereignty entailed that any economic 
problems at sub-national levels (regional, urban) needed to be addressed within the larger context of 
the national scale. Such aggregation resulted in policies biased in favor of stronger regions or cities 
within the nation-state.250 Any economic affinities that sub-national communities have outside the 
nation-state would not obtain unless channeled through that nation-state’s institutions. 
This resulted in sovereignty being conceived of as a one-dimensional possibility: a nation-state either 
has it or it does not. It became an absolute (rather than what it is today, a relative) quality. Sovereignty 
as understood today is “a right of membership, historically determined, in what amounts to a very 
exclusive political club” (Emphasis added).251 This club, the societas of states is “the most exclusive 
political club in the world and has been so for several centuries”.252 The club metaphor of course imports 
a local scale intonation as propounded by Buchanan.253 Either way, whether seen as anchored in the 
national or local scales, a sovereign state is conceived of as a territorial jurisdiction “within which state 
authority may be exercised on an exclusive basis”254 (emphasis added). It was not until the rise of federal 
states exemplified by the United States that we see a shift in the analysis towards the possible divisibility 
of sovereignty were states “co-exit and interact on a foundation of formal equality and a corresponding 
right of non-intervention”.255  
Towns with autonomous political status have been amongst the most dynamic forces in the Western 
civilization. We find them in the Greek polis, and the Roman ‘civilization’ rooted in the concept of man 
as a citizen (civis) living in a city or civitas. In medieval Germany, ‘Stadtluft macht frei’ became a legal 
maxim, and after a year and a day of breathing it, a serf could not be returned to bondage. The town 
was the antithesis of the manor, and stood for the supremacy of the law rather than the supremacy of 
the will. In the twelfth and thirteen centuries, a great league of cities, the Hausa, had begun to establish 
its own networks of diplomacy and defense, and its own body of law, making it virtually a federal state. 
Later, the unusual close relationship of republican politics and civic culture imparted to the Renaissance 
one of its most fundamental and original features, especially as seen in the evolution of Venice since 
the Middle Ages.256 
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The early modern period witnessed the demise of the autonomous city and its style of politics, and 
the rise of the modern sovereign state. Warfare played a crucial role in this demise. The sixteenth and 
seventeenth century saw a massive increase in the scale, duration and cost of warfare. Cities could not 
mobilize the massive forces that were now required to wage war. This fact had a drastic (and negative) 
impact on the autonomy of cities.257  
However, this ‘problem of scale’ was not insurmountable, at least intermittently. The Dutch 
Republic (1581-1795) was a successful example of a federation of cities that balanced the trade-off 
between economic integration and small-scale production. Similarly, the autonomy of southern German 
towns persisted through self-sufficient economies and self-contained social structures. Today, we see 
city-states such as Hamburg and Bremen form part of the German Federation, and continue to prosper 
in a globalizing world. Further afield, we see cities such as Hong Kong, Macau and Singapore relaying 
a similar story.  
But the genesis of this city-centric governance comes from the Middle East. Sumerian cities such as 
Ur were city-states as early as 4000 BC. This tradition of city autonomy was swept away over millennia 
of economic and political integration, mostly through warfare. Today however, especially given the 
ongoing process of globalization, and the increasingly important role played by supra-national 
organizations such as the United Nations, there is potential for this tradition to hold the key to a lasting 
peace in the Middle East. Imagine a region dominated by autonomous cities within a loose confederal 
structure. Each city protected by an international treaty, and having the complete freedom of 
participating in the international community as an independent nation. These global cities would then 
coordinate with not only other cities in the region, but on a global scale.   
It is submitted that the Middle East, given its rich cultural mosaic, is a prime candidate for 
empowering cities as polities. To be precise, countries like Syria and Iraq (inter alia) would be best 
constituted as confederations of charter cities. For example, in Syria, the largest cities (Aleppo, 
Damascus, Homs, Latakia, Hama, Ar-Raqqah, Deir ez-Zor, Al-Hasakah, Qamishli, and Sayyidah 
Zaynab) would be reconstituted as charter cities under the protection of international treaties under the 
United Nations. These charter cities would have a level of autonomy similar to that seen in cities such 
as Hong Kong and Macau. They are ruled by their own populations under their own ‘basic law’. They 
share natural resources that are managed by international corporations, based on geographic proximity. 
Territories outside these cities would be governed by international instruments that allow for these cities 
to form loose confederations for this purpose. A similar approach would move Iraq away from its 
current federal system (based on provinces), and towards a confederal arrangement bringing together 
charter cities that are largely autonomous. A similar approach could also be implemented in Israel 
instead of one- or two-state solutions. Over time, ‘greater Africa’ becomes studded with charter cities 
that cooperate with each other, as much as with charter cities across the globe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
257 Richard Mackenney, The City-State, 1500-1700, Republican Liberty in the Age of Princely Power (Macmillan 1989).  
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: ‘JARLSBERG’ CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS 
 
Today we see a tension in how sovereignty is shared between the local and global scales, post the nation-
state.258 There are now two lines of attack on sovereignty. One proceeds through the idea of universitas. 
The other attacks the territoriality of the Westphalian contiguous-and-non-perforated state itself. A 
nuanced reading of the concept of sovereignty suggests that there are decisive economic arguments 
militating against the existence of colossal countries—at least as contiguous and exclusive jurisdictions. 
While some literature touches on the structure of the state and its relation to the economy, in the final 
analysis, there is only an anemic treatment of what should be at the crux of constitutional designs. This 
clinging to the idea of the nation-state, even when moderated by decentralization, is anachronistic. It is 
imperative to understand that the issue is no longer the role of the nation-state. The concept of the hard-
bordered nation-state is itself flawed. Not because of the ‘hard-border’ as much as the national scale.259 
As discussed in this paper, hard-borders could very well be still needed, but cannot function properly 
beyond the city-region scale (a city and its hinterland). The nation-state is moribund. It is becoming 
irrelevant, especially to economic activity. What is gaining ground is a new paradigm of ‘glocalization’ 
where the global and local scales are effacing the need for national coagulations. 
The paper suggests the existence of a coherent school of analysis. You can see it in the writings of 
an eclectic group of scholars. They eschew scale invariance in their analysis. They are careful to identify 
how changes in the dimensions of space and time (space-time), inter alia, affect all analyses, be it legal, 
economic, political or philosophical. This group include Aristotle, Baruch Spinoza, Leopold Kohr, 
Ernst F. Schumacher, Jane Jacobs, and even Peter Kropotkin. Elsewhere I have elaborated on the key 
features of this school,260 still without giving it a proper name. Not a bad thing per se when reflecting 
on the vagaries of labels, especially in a post-modern world. But I suppose if I were to furnish one, it 
would be the ‘Lefebvrois School’, after Henri Lefebvre, a renowned French philosopher and sociologist. 
While others have touched on the essence of this school, namely the effects of scale (through proxies 
such as space, size, density or acceleration) on natural and human phenomena, it was Lefebvre who 
wrote explicitly about the concept of ‘space’ with its natural and social production. Lefebvre analyzed 
the nexus between capitalism and space production. He however offered a Marxist critique of how space 
production is controlled by certain classes. I instead emphasize allowing communities their own 
(constitutional) space—their own ‘jurisdictional footprints’.  
As has been outlined in the paper, historically, sovereignty succumbed to the concept of ‘nation’ 
through the pedigree of political economy and the economic basis thereof. This national sovereignty 
entailed that any economic problems at sub-national levels (regional, urban) needed to be addressed 
within the larger context of the national scale. Such aggregation resulted in policies biased in favor of 
stronger regions or cities within the nation-state.261 Any economic affinities that sub-national 
communities have outside the nation-state would not obtain unless channeled through that nation-state’s 
institutions. Constitutional economics (as a discipline) would not pass muster unless it is understood 
that the golden principle for constitutional design is the need to maintain polities at their ‘optimal scale’. 
While this is a shifting post that increases with, inter alia, technological progress, the ability to meet 
                                                          
258 Instances of this tension can be seen in such independence movements as in Catalonia and Scotland. 
259 Although some commentators argue that the issue is in fact that hard-borders don’t work. See for example Hopkins, Devolution in 
Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union at 15. 
260 Gussen, On the Problem of Scale: Spinozistic Sovereignty as the Logical Foundation of Constitutional Economics, On the Problem of 
Scale: The Inextricable Link between Environmental and Constitutional Laws, 13 (1) New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 
39 (2015); The Evolutionary Economic Implications of Constitutional Designs: Lessons from the Constitutional Morphogenesis of New 
England and New Zealand, 6 (2) Perspectives on Federalism E319 (2014). 
261 The reader is referred to the works by Jane Jacobs for a detailed discussion of this dynamic. See, for example, Jacobs, The Nature of 
Economies. 
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such a requirement leads into an inquiry of how states can be engineered as non-contiguous, perforated 
entities, reminiscent of a cross-section from a wheel of Jarlsberg cheese if you will, which expand or 
shrink around the optimal scale.262 The ‘holes’ or ‘eyes’ in these polities represent free charter cities 
that redefines the ‘body politic’ on a global scale. There is a second order issue in relation to the way 
constitutional economics approaches the reinvention of states: the ‘choice among constraints’ does not 
explain where the total set of available constraints arises in the first place. Constitutional economics 
seems to treat these constraints as belonging to a predetermined ‘fixed basket’, something easily 
accommodated if we do not look at sovereignty per se. The ability to distinguish between different 
scales (form the global to the local) goes a long way toward explaining how options are limited (and 
hence constraints created). This in turn results in a dynamic set of constraints to choose from. This 
however is available only where the state is the subject of analysis. In particular, when questioning the 
national scale as the default level of analysis, we can see emerge a very different set of constraints.  
Unfortunately, even when sovereignty is engaged in constitutional economics, there is still a 
lingering taste of ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ and its emphasis on the contiguous-and-non-perforated 
(nation) state. In constitutional economics, while sovereignty and jurisdiction are not usually treated 
explicitly,263 they can be gleaned from the assumptions typically made. The central feature here is still 
the same as that since the beginning of political economy discourse, which in fact is the same impetus 
underlying most theories of sovereignty: legitimization of the nation-state. Even when scalar 
differentiation is engaged, it is never in relation to the state, but to government—leaving other elements 
of the state, especially territory and population, beyond systematic inquiry. Hence, we find discourse 
on the optimal size of government, but not on the optimal size of states, where government is understood 
as only one element of the state, distinct from the latter’s territory. There has even been a tendency to 
treat ‘government’ and ‘state’ interchangeably, further disguising the essential issue of territoriality and 
the ensuing possibilities of divided sovereignty.264  
I end this article by reiterating my call for a Chicago cluster that picks up the mantel of what I refer 
to as the Lefebvrois School. Earlier in the paper I have introduced some of the scholars that could today 
be considered as part of this School. These include Gerald Frug, Paul Romer, Benjamin Barber, Yishai 
Blank, Joseph Tainter and Saskia Sassen.265 Chicago can enrich the channels of cooperation between 
these scholars. By doing so, it can be the driving force behind a new world system. One based on charter 
cities rather than nation-states.   
 
                                                          
262 See Leopold Kohr, The Overdeveloped Nations: The Diseconomies of Scale, especially Chapter 2 (Schoken Books 1978). 
263 By jurisdiction we mean all three types: legislative, executive, and judicial.  
264 See for example Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty:  A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy at 48. 
265 There are many others that are working in this field. These include Yaneer Bar-Yam, John Breuilly, Robin Dunbar, Peter Turchin, Ian 
Morris, Andreas Osiander, Siniša Maleševic, Benedict Anderson, Brian Slattery, Jennifer Neal, Jan Zielonka, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Ian 
Goldin, and Dani Rodrik. For a synopsis of their ideas, see Debora MacKenzie, Imagine There’s No Countries …, 223 (2985) The New 
Scientist 31(2014).  
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APPENDIX I: THE MODEL 
 
In this appendix I elaborate on the model introduced in section III. I assume sovereign polities 
are distributed into quartets on a two-dimensional lattice as shown in Figure AI.1. This 
assumption allows for analyzing the interaction between polities without making the analysis 
too difficult to follow.  
 
 
 
 
Figure AI.1: Top view of the original distribution of sovereign polities 
 
Quartets are assumed to be distributed randomly over the entire lattice. This assumption 
makes the model more realistic given the historical distribution of polities in any given world 
system.266  
Lattice sites could be either occupied or vacant. When occupied, they have sovereign 
polities represented by spheres with mass (𝑚). For simplicity, I assume that these masses are 
equal in the ‘original position’. The mass is a proxy for each polity’s land and population 
endowment, and hence cannot grow indefinitely given the limits on the land resource, and by 
implication on population. I refer to this mass as the socio-political mass. I assume the lattice 
to be frictionless where lattice sites are empty, such that the cost incurred by polities for 
drifting from one empty site to another is de minimis.   
Polities occupy vortices of squares of side length d. The distance between sovereign 
polities represents a proxy for ‘relational distance’ rather than a physical distance per se. The 
longer the distance, the less is the interaction between polities. When the distance is zero, the 
polity transfers all of its sovereignty to a union with another polity that takes over the decision 
making process. Sovereignty is maximized when the distance between polities is infinite.  
In order to generate wealth, polities coagulate in quartets, which we designate (clockwise) 
as A, B, C, and D, as shown in Figures AI.2. Each quartet is assumed to be far from other 
quartets as to ignore any effect arising from interaction with other formations.  
 
 
Figure AI.2: Original two-dimensional square formation 
                                                          
266 See generally Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction ; World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (University 
Press 2004). 
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In this model wealth is generated through trade with other polities. The trade flow is 
analogous to that given by the Tinbergen gravitational model.267 Sovereignty and wealth are 
hence inversely proportional.268 Political power arises from relative rather than absolute 
wealth. Relative wealth can then be transformed into other forms of power such as coercion 
and knowledge.269 The existence of relative wealth indicates a transfer of sovereignty from 
one polity to another.  
Wealth distribution is proportional to the socio-political mass. Larger polities obtain a 
larger share of the trade. Hence if a polity of mass 2𝑚 trades with a polity of mass  𝑚 over 
one trade channel, the larger polity takes two-thirds the wealth from trade.  
Moreover, we assume the ruler-ruled relationship in polities formed through fusion 
(nation-states or the universitas) to be benevolent. In other words, the wealth generated from 
trade is shared equally between polities constituting the political union.  
Each polity has the objective of increasing its total wealth (𝑊). This is done through a 
mixed strategy of rearranging the original square formation (short-term strategy), and by 
acquiring power (𝑃) which could then be used to generate more wealth (long-term strategy). 
Power results from (territorial) fusion which represents the evolution of nation-states towards 
a universitas that subsumes the sovereignty of its constituent polities. Given the historical 
oscillation between societas and universitas, we assume the expected power to average out 
over time. Furthermore, given the homogeneity of the polities in the original position, and the 
random distribution of quartets, we assume that the total number of polities in the original 
position (𝑁) is such that: 
 
∑ 𝑃𝑋(𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0 = 0   (1a) 
 
∀ 𝑋 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷} 
 
The expected power therefore equals zero in the limit:  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
𝐸(𝑃𝑋) = 0   (1b) 
 
A polity with zero or negative power would prefer to drift to another lattice site if it 
believes its expected power from doing so to be non-negative.270  
Nation-states would be stable as long as the transfer of sovereignty to the nation-state is 
paid for by a wealth differential (power over the other polities outside the nation). The 
decision by each polity to join a political union depends on the power it secures in exchange 
for its sovereignty. If the power differential disappears, the fusion becomes unstable and, 
overtime, political (territorial) fission ensues and polities drift away from the quartet.  
The total wealth of the quartet is equal to the sum of the trade between the four polities 
(six channels of trade):  
 
                                                          
267 Tinbergen, Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy. 
268 This assumption accounts for the effects of globalisation and a world system dominated by free trade. Further discussion of 
this point can be found in sections II and IV.  
269 See Toffler, Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century. 
270 In physics, unlike energy, power can be negative. Hence, power is defined as the change of energy over time: 𝑃 =  
𝑑𝐸
𝑑𝑡
. 
Where energy is decreasing, power is negative. I interpret negative power as a proxy for increasing debt or deficit.   
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𝑊 =  ∑ ∑ (
𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑗
(𝑑𝑖𝑗)
2)
4
𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑖≠4
4
𝑖=1     (2) 
 
For the original square formation in figure AI.2,  𝑊𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  5 (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) , and each sovereign 
polity gets an equal share of 𝑊𝑖 = (
5
4
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) .  
 
 
A. Wealth Maximization and Polycentricity 
 
In the next stage, each quartet attempts to maximize its wealth by maximizing the total 
wealth of the quartet. This would require satisfying the following condition:271  
 
𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑗 = 2 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑗   ,   𝑖 ≠ 𝑗   (3) 
 
And given our assumption that all polities have the same socio-political mass, we have:  
 
𝑑 = exp (
𝑚2
2
)     (4) 
 
 
Maximized wealth would hence have the form W =  6 ln[(𝛽)1/𝛽] , were 𝛽 = 𝑑2.  
 
In order to satisfy this maximization condition, the quartet moves from the two-
dimensional square formation where all polities occupy sites on the lattice to a three 
dimensional hierarchy―a pyramid arrangement as shown in Figure A.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure AI.3: Top-view of the inverted pyramid for maximizing total wealth 
 
One likely formation is where three of the polities are “lifted off” the lattice (a form of 
partial fusion), while one polity remains in its original position (on the lattice). I interpret this 
inverted pyramid as representative of polycentricity “in which powers are shared between 
sovereign bodies … which reaffirm their separateness”.272 Under this configuration, total 
                                                          
271 Taking the total derivative of wealth and setting it to zero we get: 
 
𝛿𝑊 = ∑ [𝛿𝑚𝑖  . 𝑚𝑗  . (𝑑𝑖𝑗)
−2
+ 𝛿𝑚𝑗  . 𝑚𝑖  . (𝑑𝑖𝑗)
−2
− 2 (𝑑𝑖𝑗)
−3
 . 𝛿(𝑑𝑖𝑗)] = 0  
𝛿𝑊 =  ∑ {(𝑑𝑖𝑗)
−2
 [𝛿(𝑚𝑖  𝑚𝑗) − 𝛿 (ln ((𝑑𝑖𝑗)
2
))]} = 0  
 
272 Prokhovnik, Spinoza's Conception of Sovereignty at 300-301. To be precise, the arrangement is most likely to be in the 
spirit of subsidiarity, given the enduring effect of pre-existing social hierarchies. The model is an ideal-type of this outcome.  
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wealth is increased to 𝑊 = 6 (
𝑚2
𝑑2
). Assuming the same distance 𝑑 (= exp (
𝑚2
2
)) represents 
the dimensions of the original square arrangement, the wealth of each sovereign polity is now 
increased by  (
1
4
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) . Power under polycentricity arises from the wealth differential relative 
to the square arrangement. Because all polities in this polycentric arrangement are identical, 
nothing turns on which one stays on the grid. A rotation strategy would also be envisaged.  
The pyramid arrangement embodies the power exchange idea as stated by Buchanan and 
Tullock.273  Part of each polity’s sovereignty is shared with the other polities in the pyramid. 
Given that the objective of each polity is to maximize its own wealth rather than that of the 
quartet, and given polities do so through cooperation toward a common objective, this 
configuration represents the hybrid between societas and universitas as envisaged in The 
Calculus of Consent.  
 
 
B. On the Creation of Polities 
 
I now analyze the rational for the creation of nation-states and universitas. Instead of the 
original square arrangement, polity A could negotiate a social contract where polity B 
exchanges its sovereignty through a total fusion as shown in Figure AI.4(a).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure AI.4: (a) Polity B decides to give up its sovereignty to polity A (b) The fusion occurs 
between A and C (c) The fusion occurs after the creation of a polycentric configuration 
 
 
 
The double lines indicate the existence of two trade channels between the entities, one of 
which is a modification of the channel between B and C under the square configuration. This 
arrangement is hence analogous to a federal arrangement rather than a unitary state. Polities 
within the federal state keep their trade channels, and are still able to trade directly with 
polities outside the union.  
                                                          
273 Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy at 19.  
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The wealth of the nation composed of A and B in Figure AI.4(a) is equal to:  
 
𝑊𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 = (2) [(
1
2
) (
𝑚2
(√2𝑑)
2)] + (2) [(
1
2
) (
𝑚2
(𝑑)2
)] = (
3
2
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)  
 (5) 
 
The individual wealth of polity A and polity B is now (
3
4
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) . This is a decrease in their 
individual wealth from (
5
4
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) under the square formation, by an amount of  (
1
2
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
). The 
decrease, which represents the cost of fusion between polities A and B, makes their political 
union unstable. 
 
The wealth of the other polities is given by:  
 
𝑊𝐶 = (2) [(
1
2
) (
𝑚2
(√2𝑑)
2)] + (
1
2
) (
𝑚2
(𝑑)2
) =  (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)    (6) 
𝑊𝐷 = (2) [(
1
2
) (
𝑚2
(𝑑)2
)] + (
1
2
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) =  (
3
2
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)    (7) 
 
The power of Polities A and B (individually) relative to polity C is given by:  
 
(𝑃𝐴 |𝐶) = (𝑃𝐵 |𝐶) = (
3
4
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) − (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) =  (
−1
4
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)    (8) 
 
Similarly, the power of A and B relative to D is equal to (
−3
4
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
). The negative power 
suggests that the created nation-state would face a trade deficit and increasing debts. The 
configuration of a federal state under Figure AI.4(a) is therefore untenable.  
 
If polity A unites with B through a unitary state (rather than a federal state), the trade lines 
that B had before the fusion would all disappear. Polity B would be ‘lifted off’ the lattice, but 
the outcome is very different from under polycentricity. This leaves only single lines of trade 
in Figure A.4(a). The wealth of the unitary nation-state and the other polities is now equal to:  
 
?̃?𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 = [(
2
3
) (
2𝑚2
(√2𝑑)
2)] + [(
2
3
) (
2𝑚2
(𝑑)2
)] = 2 (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)  (9) 
 
Each polity in the nation now has wealth equal to (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) . The wealth of the other polities is 
equal to:  
 
?̃?𝐶 = [(
1
3
) (
2𝑚2
(√2𝑑)
2)] + (
1
2
) (
𝑚2
(𝑑)2
) =  (
5
6
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)    (10) 
?̃?𝐷 = [(
1
3
) (
2𝑚2
(𝑑)2
)] + (
1
2
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) =  (
7
6
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)     (11) 
 
By opting for a unitary nation rather than a federal state, the nation polities of A and B 
now (individually) have power over polity C but not polity D. The resulting unitary nation 
has power over both C and D.  
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The above analysis would go to explain why federal systems become more centralized 
over time. Two prime examples of this trend are the United States and the Commonwealth of 
Australia.274 The latter is probably the quintessential example of this trend.275  
 
If however polity A decides to unite in a federal state with polity C instead of B (we refer 
to the resulting state as the Apex Nation), as shown in Figure AI.4(b), the resulting wealth is 
now given by: 
 
𝑊𝐴𝑝𝑒𝑥 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 2 [(
1
2
) (
𝑚2
(𝑑)2
)] + 2 [(
1
2
) (
𝑚2
(𝑑)2
)]  = 2 (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)   (12) 
 
The individual wealth of the polities constituting the Apex nation is still  (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) . As to 
polities B and D:  
 
𝑊𝐵 = 𝑊𝐷 = 2 [(
1
2
) (
𝑚2
(𝑑)2
)] + (
1
2
) (
𝑚2
(√2𝑑)
2) =  (
5
4
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)   (13) 
 
The federal state configuration under Figure AI.4(b) is hence unstable.  On the other hand, 
building a unitary state under Figure AI.4(b) would result in individual power for A and C 
relative to B and D:  
 
?̃?𝐴𝑝𝑒𝑥 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = [(
2
3
) (
2𝑚2
(𝑑)2
)] + [(
2
3
) (
2𝑚2
(𝑑)2
)]  = (
8
3
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)   (14) 
 
Now each polity in the Apex nation has wealth equal to (
4
3
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
). The other polities get:  
 
?̃?𝐵 = ?̃?𝐷 = [(
1
3
) (
2𝑚2
(𝑑)2
)] + (
1
2
) (
𝑚2
(√2𝑑)
2) =  (
11
12
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)   (15) 
 
If the nation building by units A and C started after moving into the pyramid arrangement 
as shown in Figure AI.4(c), which is interpreted as closer cooperation between B and D as a 
response to the unification between A and C, the wealth of the nation is given as follows:  
 
𝑊𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 2 [(
1
2
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)] + 2 [(
1
2
) (
 𝑚2
𝑑2
)] = 2 (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)    (16) 
 
Each polity in the nation gets (
𝑚2
𝑑2
), while the other sovereign polities get:  
 
                                                          
274 Daniel Judah Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (Crowell 1972). John A. Ferejohn, The New 
Federalism: Can the States Be Trusted? (Hoover Press 1997); James A. Maxwell, The Fiscal Impact of Federalism in the 
United States (1946); Ann O'M Bowman and Richard C Kearney, The Resurgence of the States (Prentice Hall 1986); Steven G 
Calabresi, A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 (3) Michigan Law 
Review 752 (1995). 
275 Alan Fenna, The Malaise of Federalism: Comparative Reflections on Commonwealth–State Relations, 66 (3) Australian 
Journal of Public Administration 298 (2007). Lori Thorlakson, Comparing Federal Institutions: Power and Representation in 
Six Federations, 26 (2) West European Politics 1 (2003). Brian Galligan, A Federal Republic: Australia's Constitutional 
System of Government (CUP Archive 1995); A. J. Brown, Federalism, Regionalism and the Reshaping of Australian 
Governance, in Federalism and regionalism in Australia: new approaches, new institutions  ed. A. J. Brown and J. A. Bellamy 
(ANU Press 2007). 
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𝑊𝐵 = 𝑊𝐷 = 2 [(
1
2
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)] + (
1
2
) (
 𝑚2
𝑑2
) = (
3
2
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)    (17) 
 
And under a unitary nation we get:  
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)   (18) 
?̃?𝐵 = ?̃?𝐷 = [(
1
3
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2𝑚2
𝑑2
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1
2
) (
 𝑚2
𝑑2
) = (
7
6
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)    (19) 
 
A summary of the power under the configurations in Figure AI.4 for a federal state (unitary 
state) is shown in Table AI.1 (Table AI.2) below. These powers represent the wealth 
differential between polity A and polity B taken individually relative to the other polities (C 
and D respectively). Note that even if polities A and B consider the power calculation from 
the perspective of the nation-state rather than their individual wealth, the best outcome is still 
under a unitary state configuration under Figure AI.4(c). 
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Table AI.1: Polities A and B power in each of the configurations in Figure 4 under a federal 
state 
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Table AI.2: Polities A and B power in each of the configurations in Figure 4 under a unitary 
state 
 
Given the payoffs in Table AI.1 and Table AI.2, polities A and B would choose a unitary 
configuration under Figure AI.4(b). The polities outside the Apex nation would prefer a 
unitary state configuration under Figure AI.4(c) as it provides highest individual wealth for 
each.  
 
C. On the Rationale for War 
 
It is useful to point out how war, either for the objective of acquiring another sovereign polity 
or for keeping it in an existing union, would increase the power of the resulting nation-state. 
When war is waged on a polity, that polity is not only ‘lifted off’ the lattice, but its identity is 
erased to the effect that power is now calculated from the perspective of the resulting nation. 
The cost of war is seen in the lost trade channels by the polities involved.  With this in mind, 
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the payoffs under the federal and unitary nation formations in Figure AI.4 are given in Table 
AI.3.  
 
 
Nation total power under federal state 
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Nation total power under unitary state 
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Table AI.3: Payoffs from fusion through war under Figure 4 configurations 
 
The above payoffs would go to explain why political fusion would be associated with war 
on polities outside the union or by civil war. An example of this approach can be seen in the 
United States both through the American War of Independence (1775 to 1783) and the 
American Civil War (1861 to 1865).276  
 
 
D. On the Stability of Polities 
 
Going back to the Apex nation, once it forms as a unitary state under Figure AI.4(b), the 
other polities could choose to: (1) create their own nation (option one) as shown in Figure 
AI.5, (2)  join the Apex nation (option two) as shown in Figure AI.6, or (3) drift away into a 
different lattice site, away  from their current quartet. All options will make the nation-state 
relative wealth disappear.  
 
 
 
Figure AI.5: option one in response to the Formation of the Apex nation 
 
 
Under option one, which evolves from the unitary state configuration in Figure A.4(b), 
each nation obtains the same wealth:  
 
𝑊𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (
1
2
) [(
(2𝑚)2
𝑑2
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)   (20) 
 
                                                          
276 Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (Indiana 
University Press 1977); Peter J. Parish, The American Civil War (Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc. 1975); Claudia D. Goldin 
and Frank D. Lewis, The Economic Cost of the American Civil War: Estimates and Implications, 35 (2) The Journal of 
Economic History 299 (1975). 
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𝑊𝑂𝑙𝑑 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (
1
2
) [(
(2𝑚)2
𝑑2
)] = 2 (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)   (21) 
 
Under option two, one of the sovereign polities, say D, joins the A and C nation, as shown 
in Figure AI.6.  
 
 
Figure AI.6: Option two in response to the formation of the Apex nation 
 
 
Now the wealth of the universitas equals:  
 
𝑊𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑠 = (
3
4
) ∗ (
3𝑚2
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9
4
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
)  (22) 
 
Each polity in the universitas has  (
3
4
) (
𝑚2
𝑑2
) . The same wealth is obtained by the polity 
outside the universitas. Even if the power of the universitas is taken as a non-divisible entity 
(where the universitas is achieved by war), the polity outside the universitas would still 
destabilize the universitas by improving its expected power, either by joining the universitas 
or drifting away from it.  
Both options represented in Figures AI.5 and AI.6 result in elimination of nation-state 
power and hence in political fission. The deficit in the value of sovereignty transferred into 
the Apex nation and the universitas necessitates a new social contract.  
 
Why then do we see relatively stable nation-states (and universitas)? We have already looked 
at how war could be used to stabilize fusion. Another stabilization strategy emerges from how 
the nation-state externalizes the cost of fusing its socio-political mass. An illustration of this 
strategy is shown in Figure AI.7 where the configurations in Figures AI.4(a) and AI.4(b) are 
modified by new polities which drift from other parts of the lattice (as a result of the 
dissolution of nations in other quartets). Nation-states are now powerful relative to other 
polities.  
 
 
Figure AI.7: The nation-states externalize their fusion cost. New (drifting) Polities are shown 
in grey color 
 
Now, under Figure AI.7(a), the nation-states have 𝑃 =  (
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)  over polities B and D, 
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) over the new polity C (shown in grey). Given their negative power, the 
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other polities would respond by fusing as (for example) in Figure AI.7(b). The fusion would 
continue with the arrival of new drifting entities.    
This stabilization is interpreted as a perpetual need to increase trade with polities outside 
the original quartet, which echoes the neo-liberal emphasis on economic growth.277 Per this 
model, economic growth is seen as a stabilization mechanism. The same arguments can be 
made for stabilizing universitas as shown in Figure AI.8.  
 
 
 
 
Figure AI.8: Stabilization of universitas through the externalization of fusion cost 
 
From our assumption of random distribution of quartets on the lattice (in the original 
position), the flow of drifting polities would be similarly random throughout the evolution of 
political fusion and fission. This would make fission only a question of time.  
  
                                                          
277 David M. Kotz, Contradictions of Economic Growth in the Neoliberal Era: Accumulation and Crisis in the Contemporary 
US Economy, 40 (2) Review of Radical Political Economics  (2008) 174; The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008: A 
Systemic Crisis of Neoliberal Capitalism, 41 (3) Review of Radical Political Economics 305 (2009); Evelyne Huber and 
Frederick Solt, Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism, 39 (3) Latin American Research Review 150 (2004). 
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APPENDIX II: THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY (HYPOTAXIS)278 
 
The principle of subsidiarity reconciles the dichotomy between methodological individualism 
and methodological holism along a continuum that envisages a vox populi underlying 
decision-making through multi-level governance systems. This understanding suggests that 
referenda (qua methodological individualism) are as much a component of subsidiarity as is 
federalism (qua methodological holism). Subsidiarity does not only envisage multi-level 
governance, but also emphasizes direct democracy practices such as citizen-initiated 
referenda. As a constitutional principle, subsidiarity necessitates an explicit recognition of 
subnational levels of government (including local government), as well as processual outlets 
for vox populi beyond the formalities of elections.   
 
Next I elaborate on methodological individualism, methodological collectivism, and their 
connection to subsidiarity.  
 
 
A. Methodological Individualism 
 
Methodological individualism is a social ontology, or a form of social-scientific 
explanation,279 exemplified by the homo economicus model of neoclassical economics and its 
marginalist revolution. “Strictly speaking, methodological individualism is a [normative] 
principle, rule, or program telling historians and social scientists how to define collective 
concepts, explain social phenomena, and/or reduce macro to micro”.280 This methodology 
contemplates the sovereignty of the individual. It can be traced back to the writings of Max 
Weber and Joseph Schumpeter in the early twentieth century,281 although some attribute its 
first formulation to Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century.282 It was brought to sociology 
from economics where it has become the staple of mainstream analysis (neoclassical and to a 
lesser extent Austrian). Its philosophical counterpart is known as reductionism.283  
Methodological individualism has three constituent tenets: (1) only individuals have aims 
and interests (individualism), (2) individuals behave in a way consistent with their aims and 
circumstances (rationality principle), (3) only individual actions create and change social 
systems. In other words, methodological individualism furnishes ‘micro’ foundations for 
explaining ‘macro’ social phenomena.284 According to this view, society is simply the sum-
total of individuals’ interactions.  
Methodological individualism should be seen as a point on a continuum of explanatory 
propositions.285 A stronger form of methodological individualism is atomism. Methodological 
                                                          
278 For the connection between subsidiarity and hypotaxis see Patrick McKinley Brennan, Subsidiarity in the Tradition of 
Catholic Social Doctrine, in Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity 29 ed. M. Evans and A. Zimmerman (Springer  2014).  
279 The emphasis here is on individualism as a methodology or road to knowledge, rather than as an ontology about social 
reality, or epistemology about possible knowledge. The methodological emphasis ties into governance as a road to knowledge 
through decision-making processes producing the legal systems underlying governance structures.  
280 Lars  Udehn, The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism, 28 Annual Review of Sociology 479 (2002). 
281 See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (University of California Press 1978), and 
Joseph  Schumpeter, On the Concept of Social Value, 23 (2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 213 (1909).  
282 Steven  Lukes, Methodological Individualism Reconsidered, 19 (2) The British Journal of Sociology 119 (1968); Udehn, 
The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism at 481. 
283 See for example M.  Rutherford, Institutions in Economics: The Old and New Institutionalism (Cambridge University Press 
1996). See also J. W. N.  Watkins, The Principle of Methodological Individualism, 3 (10) The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 186 (1952). 
284 Jeffrey  Alexander, The Micro-Macro Link (University of California Press 1987). 
285 For the various forms of methodological individualism see also Leon J. Goldstein, The Two Theses of Methodological 
Individualism, 9 (33) The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (1958). Udehn, The Changing Face of 
Methodological Individualism. 
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individualism however differs from pure atomism where the interactions between individual 
actors is not given any attention, and where the only possible reality is the individual. This 
strand underlies theories such as the theory of social contract and the theory of general 
equilibrium. On the other hand, a weaker form of methodological individualism is 
methodological localism where individuals are taken as socially situated and constituted, and 
hence shaped by social institutions and the history of society.286 Under localism, society is the 
conventional means of co-ordination between individual actions.287 That is to say, society is 
seen as a cluster of institutions that explain the inter-personal means of coordination.288 Here 
we see the influence of Austrian and Popperian respectively (subjective) social and (objective) 
institutional explanations of individualism. These weaker forms of individualism lead to a 
‘spontaneous order’ understanding of society where the interaction of individuals creates 
(unconsciously) social phenomena. At its weakest point, we see individualism explained 
under James Coleman’s structuralism (and further under analytical Marxism) where social 
structure influences individual actions as well as combines the actions of individuals to 
produce systemic outcomes.289  
 
B. Methodological Collectivism (Holism) 
 
In contrast to methodological individualism and the underlying reductionist approach, 
methodological collectivism asserts a systems approach to social phenomena where the focus 
of the analysis is on the system rather than its constituent parts. This collective understand of 
social life came into prominence in the nineteenth century on the hand of Louis de Bonald 
and Auguste Comte. This extends to a stronger version of methodological holism that is based 
on a complexity theory paradigm where societies are modelled as complex adaptive systems 
and the analytical emphasis is on the interdependence of actions by individuals within such 
system. Under holism, society is more than the Holism emphasizes an evolutionary rather 
than striving towards an ideal-type. Moreover, the causal analysis under holism matures away 
from the idea of a single driver and instead looks at a modulation matrix of many factors that 
influence the system simultaneously. Instead of seeking causal connections, holism looks for 
propensities that move the system in a general direction. Probably, the most important aspect 
of holism is accepting that people have multiple identities rather than one constant behavioral 
pattern.  
Holism also has three constituent tenets: (1) Society is more than its constituent parts 
(holism), (2) society affects individual aims (collectivism), and (3) society influences and 
constraints individual behavior (institutional analysis).290 In essence, holism contemplates the 
existence of a social entity larger than the sum-total of its constituent individual interests and 
policies, an entity with its own interests and aims. In other words, holism accepts group sub-
consciousness à la Jung,291 as opposed to the spontaneous order of Scottish Enlightenment 
                                                          
286 See Daniel  Little, Actor-Cantered Sociology and the New Pragmatism, in Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate 55 
ed. Julie Zahle and Finn Collin (Springer 2014). This understanding of methodological individualism could be traced back to 
the Austrian school of economics where individuals are seen as cultural beings living in society. See Udehn, The Changing 
Face of Methodological Individualism at 487.  
287 Joseph Agassi, Methodological Individualism, 11 (3) The British Journal of Sociology 244, 264 (1960).  
288 This understanding is closer to Popper and his emphasis on situational logic. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its 
Enemies, Vol. 1: Plato, Vol. 2: Hegel and Marx (Routledge & Kegan Paul [1945] 1966). 
289 See also Udehn, The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism at 494, 496 and 499.  
290 Agassi, Methodological Individualism at 244.  
291 This is in contrast to Freud who espoused an individualist psychologism in explaining social phenomena. See Agassi, 
Methodological Individualism at 246. Goldstein, The Two Theses of Methodological Individualism at 9. 
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(and later on Austrian Economics) where social phenomena are not consciously created but 
are the unintended consequences of individual aims.  
C. Attempts to Reconcile Individualism and Holism 
 
The idea of a continuum from strong individualism to strong collectivism is not new. Some 
have already suggested complementarity between these methodologies.292 The gist of these 
approaches is the understanding that: (1) there are many versions of individualism and 
collectivism, and (2) the methodological usefulness of each of these approaches is contingent 
on the nature of the social phenomena under investigation. To understand this argument I will 
invoke an analogy with physical phenomena, and the usefulness of (Newtonian) classical 
versus quantum mechanics. Both have a ‘range’ of applicability depending on scale: classical 
mechanics accurately describes phenomena that can be observed due to their scale, namely 
size (larger than a molecule and smaller than a planet), temperature (close to room 
temperature), and speed (significantly less than the speed of light). Where the scale is not 
within these parameters, classical mechanics becomes inaccurate and quantum mechanics has 
to be employed. The same scalar divide plays a role in reconciling individualism and 
collectivism. These methodologies produce useful results and provide accurate normative 
signals depending on the scale of social phenomena: the more complex these phenomena are, 
the more likely they will require a shift from individualism to collectivism.  
For our purposes in this paper, this suggests a subsidiarity rational guiding the 
reconciliation between individualism and collectivism. To understand this point, we first have 
to ‘unpack’ the principle of subsidiarity itself and then explain how it employs both 
individualism and collectivism.  
 
 
D. A Brief Introduction to the Principle of Subsidiarity 
 
The principle of subsidiarity is an organizational principle that originated in Mosaic Law,293 
transferred to Greek political and social thought,294 and later elaborated on by St. Thomas 
Aquinas and medieval scholastics, before being updated by the Catholic Church as a social 
doctrine.295 The principle places a constitutional responsibility on higher levels of government 
not only to enable the autonomy of lower levels, but to provide these lower levels with 
                                                          
292 See for example, Christina List and Kai Spiekermann, Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A 
Reconciliation, 107 (4) American Political Science Review 629 (2013); Marian Noga, Methodological Individualism Versus 
Holism in Institutional Economics, 3 (15) Economics (Ekonomia) 38 (2011).  
293 See Exodus 18: 13-27. Moses paid attention to his father-in-law’s counsel and choose from among the people competent 
men to be in charge of thousands, hundreds, fifties and tens. In the book of Exodus we read about Jethro, Moses’ father-in-law, 
and the appointment of judges (Exodus 18). The story goes as follows. Jethro objected to Moses’ approach in managing the 
affair of the Israelites. Moses wanted to be the sole source on the law and how it applied. Jethro saw the long-term instability 
inherent in this approach. He advised his son-in-law to adopt what could be called today ‘subsidiarity’.  Moses hence chose 
capable men and made them leaders. These judges now decided the law for the people, save for difficult cases which were still 
brought to Moses. Now the law was able to evolve—to allow for local variation. I map this Mosaic approach unto 
sustainability.  The analogy sets environmental law as this Mosaic Law that needs to be dispensed to the people, and that the 
people need to adhere to for their own salvation. Sustainability is Moses. But just like Moses, it cannot overcome what 
Leopold Kohr, a rather obscure Austrian economist, called ‘the problem of scale’. In the words of his most famous protégé, 
Ernst F. Schumacher, this problem can be described as follows: ‘[s]mall scale operations, no matter how numerous, are always 
less likely to be harmful to the natural environment than large-scale ones’ (Ernst F  Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: 
Economics as If People Mattered (Hartlet and Marks 1999 [1973]). Kohr spoke of a ‘characteristic scale’. See Kohr, The 
Overdeveloped Nations: The Diseconomies of Scale. In the context of the Israelites, this scale was what Jethro’s advice is all 
about. Even if we are to follow Nietzsche and dispense with our Mosaic analogy in entirety, we still end up praying for 
subsidiarity. 
294 Millon-Delsol, L'état Subsidiaire at 15.  
295 L'état Subsidiaire at 15. For a detailed account of the theological origins of subsidiarity, and for its counterpart in Calvinism, 
see Kent Van Til, Subsidiarity and Sphere-Sovereignty: A Match Made In ...? , 69 (3) Theological Studies 610 (2008). 
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necessary support.296 The principle essentially makes providing support to local government 
central government’s primary responsibility. In the language of systems theory, the principle 
could be seen as analogous to managing increasing complexity through distributed systems.  
The role of the principle of subsidiarity as a cornerstone in constitutional architecture 
straddles both unitary and federal states. For example, (the English translation of) the 
preamble of the 1997 Polish Constitution states that the Constitution is based ‘on the principle 
of subsidiarity in the strengthening [of] the powers of citizens and their communities’. At the 
same time, art3 of the Constitution states that ‘[t]he Republic of Poland shall be a unitary 
State’. However, (the official English translation of) art5a of the 1999 Swiss Federal 
Constitution states that ‘[t]he principle of subsidiarity must be observed in the allocation and 
performance of state task’, while art1 declares Switzerland a Confederation. Subsidiarity as a 
constitutional law can be seen in both unitary and federal states.  
The subsidiarity principle furnishes the promise of a truly pluralistic society, where the 
local scale is neither abolished nor reduced to mere agency of national scale. It attempts to 
navigate the dichotomies of liberty and unity, variety and commonality, intervention and non-
intervention. More importantly, the ‘autonomy’ inherent in subsidiarity imports a democratic 
dimension not possible under modalities of de-concentration (where sub-national governance 
structures remain accountable to national institutions) or non-democratic decentralization. 
Subsidiarity corrects this democratic deficit.  
It is useful at this point to elucidate the relationship of polycentricity to subsidiarity. 
Polycentricity has three main attributes.297 First, it consists of multiple decision-making 
centers (distributed system). Second, it has an overarching system of rules defining the 
jurisdictional relationship of these centers to one another (rule of law). Third, it involves 
evolutionary competition and cooperation between the different decision-making centers 
(leading to spontaneity or self-organisation). Subsidiarity enters the picture where the multiple 
decision-making centers function autonomously; where ‘sovereignty’ is shared between these 
centers (but not necessarily divided between them as under federalism). Subsidiarity maleates 
the hierarchies that would otherwise dominate in polycentric political systems,   making such 
hierarchies adaptable to change. This paper expands on how subsidiarity guides the nesting 
principle at higher scales of governance.298 
One of the weaker versions of the subsidiarity principle can be found in the Tenth 
Amendment to the US Constitution where it states that ‘powers not delegated to the [federal 
government] by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people’. A more recent formulation of the principle was established in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in December 2000.299 The principle 
is also central to the European Charter of Local Self Government (art4(2) and art4(3)).300 The 
most progressive statement of the principle can be found in the 1999 Swiss Federal 
                                                          
296  R.  Herzog, Subsidiaritätsprinzip, vol. 10, Historiches Wӧrterbuch Der Philosophie 482 (Schwabe 1998). Cited in Stefan  
Gosepath, The Principle of Subsidiarity at 157, in Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights, and Social 
Institutions 157 ed. Andreas Føllesdal and Thomas Pogge (Springer 2005). 
297 Aligica and Tarko, Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond. 
298 See also Graham Marshall, Nesting, Subsidiarity, and Community-Based Environmental Governance Beyond the Local 
Level, 2 (1) International Journal of the Commons 75 (2008). Marshall and Ostrom sterilise the political economy aspects of 
subsidiarity, for example when it comes to organising governance around Spinoza’s rendition of sovereignty. See Gussen, On 
the Problem of Scale: Spinozistic Sovereignty as the Logical Foundation of Constitutional Economics.  
299 Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law. 
300 For a critique of the principle of subsidiarity in the context of the European Union see Christian Kirchner, The Principle of 
Subsidiarity in the Treaty on European Union: A Critique from a Perspective of Constitutional Economics, 6 Tulane Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 291 (1998). 
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Constitution, art5a: ‘The principle of subsidiarity must be observed in the allocation and 
performance of state tasks.’301 The methodological individualist version in given in art6: ‘All 
individuals shall take responsibility for themselves and shall, according to their abilities, 
contribute to achieving the tasks of the state and society,’ while the methodological 
collectivist version can be seen in art3: ‘The Cantons are sovereign except to the extent that 
their sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution. They exercise all rights that are not 
vested in the Confederation.’ 
Subsidiarity is a concept wider than federalism and subsumes the latter as one of its 
modalities.302 Subsidiarity is about limiting sovereignty. Federalism limits that sovereignty 
by dividing it between federal and state levels. In this sense, subsidiarity is not only a wider 
concept than federalism, but a more dynamic one. Subsidiarity envisages a pendulum-like 
shift in the seat of decision-making, from the individual to the national state (and all the socio-
political entities that lie in between) depending on the context and the time at which the 
decision is to be made. Hence, under subsidiarity there would be a considerable overlap 
between different levels of governance, and that overlap would allow for removing decision-
making between these levels over time. One way of limiting sovereignty is through dividing 
sovereignty between different levels of government and then attempting to centralize some of 
the functions at the federal level. However, sovereignty could also be limited by local 
autonomy in a ‘quasi federal’ arrangement where the central (federal) government continues 
to ‘succor’ lower levels of government. It could also be limited to ‘single-issue’ politics where 
citizens propose changes to legislation (including non-constitutional matters) and government 
‘succors’ such initiatives by carrying them through provided there are no constitutional bars 
on the same. In summary, subsidiarity looks at limiting sovereignty. Federalism is only one 
mode of achieving the same, through dividing sovereignty between (usually) two tiers of 
government.303 Under subsidiarity there is a political exchange that sees a wide margin of 
local autonomy weaved into multi-level governance structures.  
The literature provides a number of taxonomies.304 I briefly discuss two of the most 
relevant ones. The first taxonomy can be grouped under three headings: liberty (non-
intervention), justice (transfer of competencies), and efficiency (assistance in the form of 
limited intervention).305 Under the liberty taxonomy of subsidiarity there are two main schools 
of thought. The first is that of Johannes Althusius who adopted a territorial interpretation of 
subsidiarity (inspired by orthodox Calvinism).306 In this school we also find a consociational 
                                                          
301 Adopted by the popular vote on 28  November 2004, in force since 1 January 2008  (Federal Council Decree of 3 October 
2003, Federal Council Decree of 26 January 2005, Federal Council Decree of 7 Nov. 2007 – AS 2007 5765 5771; BB1 2002 
2291, 2003 6591, 2005 951). 
302 On the relationship between subsidiarity and federalism see also John  Wanna, Common Cause, Strengthening Australia’s 
Cooperative Federalism: Final Report to the Council for the Australian Federation (Council for the Australian Federation 
2009). Due to the nature of subsidiarity’s relationship to sovereignty, its role as a cornerstone in constitutional architecture 
straddles both unitary and federal states. For example, (the English translation of) the preamble of the 1997 Polish Constitution 
states that the Constitution is based ‘on the principle of subsidiarity in the strengthening [of] the powers of citizens and their 
communities’. At the same time, art3 of the Constitution states that ‘[t]he Republic of Poland shall be a unitary State’. On the 
other hand, (the official English translation of) art5a of the 1999 Swiss Federal Constitution states that ‘[t]he principle of 
subsidiarity must be observed in the allocation and performance of state task’, while art1 declares Switzerland a Confederation. 
303 This explains why the US and Australia federal constitutions do not mention local government. 
304 See also Aaron  Martin, The Principle of Subsidiarity and Institutional Predispositions, CAP Research Group on European 
Affairs (2010).  
305 See Andreas Føllesdal, Competing Conceptions of Subsidiarity, in Nomos LV: Federalism and Subsidiarity 214 (New York 
University Press 2014); Subsidiarity, 6 (2) Journal of Political Philosophy 231 (1998); The Principle of Subsidiarity as a 
Constitutional Principle in International Law, 2 (1) Global Constitutionalism 37 (2013).  
306 Althusius was part of the Calvinist political thought on liberty (inspired by the ‘city fathers of Geneva’). Calvinist resistance 
theory seized the language of liberty and framed it in the biblical Exodus narrative. The theory was presented as fighting for 
freedom from civil and ecclesiastical bondage. Althusius followed this tradition in arguing for popular self-government, 
emphasizing republican liberty and equality; “Althusius saw the absolute liberty of conscience as the natural corollary to the 
absolute sovereignty of God, a doctrinal staple of Calvinism”: John Witte Jr, Natural Rights, Popular Sovereignty, and 
Covenant Politics: Johannes Althusius and the Dutch Revolt and Republic, 87 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 565, 
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(community-based) version,307 where emphasis is on functionality rather than on territoriality. 
While Althusius builds his subsidiarity on existing geo-social entities such as cities, 
consociationalism builds its subsidiarity on a functional organisation of political units. The 
second school under liberty is confederal subsidiarity, which adopts methodological 
individualism rather than collectivism (as under Althusius).308 This school also requires local 
government to be able to veto any intervention from the central government in its affairs, 
including the right to exit from any confederal arrangements, even by force if necessary. 
Because both schools, Althusian/Consocial and confederal, see subsidiarity as a mechanism 
to ensure the liberty of citizens from interventions by a central government, there is no 
emphasis on the need for central government intervention. Under justice, there are also two 
schools. The first is embedded in Catholic teachings where the state has to maintain respect 
for the individual and the family. The second comes from liberal contractarianism were civil 
deliberations between individuals (methodological individualism) lead to a just (and 
legitimate) organisation of society. Both schools emphasize prescriptive subsidiarity. The 
third strand, efficiency, has one main school of thought, fiscal federalism, which provides 
strong prescriptive signals for central government intervention.  
Under the second taxonomy,309 subsidiarity is either instrumental or intrinsic. If 
instrumental, it could be based on methodological individualism, resulting in economy-
oriented subsidiarity, or it could be based on methodological collectivism, which gives 
politically-oriented subsidiarity. The latter is an integration of objectives from the economy 
and the community. Alternatively, if subsidiarity is intrinsic, it could be civil-society oriented 
or communal, similar to Catholic individualism, or transparency oriented (based on 
collectivism). The transparency oriented strand is comprehensive in that it integrates the three 
spheres present in the other strands: the economic, the political and the communal.  
The above typologies can be integrated into three core principles of subsidiarity that cut 
across methodological individualism and methodological collectivism.310 The first is a 
positive version, where a ‘rule of assistance’ requires higher levels of organisation to support 
lower levels (down to the individual) where they cannot perform the functions of governance. 
This rule would be violated where for example the central government refuses to assist upon 
the appeal of a local government, or when the local government requests aid for something it 
already can perform for itself.311 This subprinciple resonates with an ancient concept in 
western political theory where the state has a duty to protect its subjects and a reciprocal duty 
of obedience on the subjects towards the state.312 The second subprinciple is the ‘ban on 
interference’, a negative version of the subsidiarity principle, where the higher level of 
organisation is prohibited from interfering in the affairs of the lower level. This rule would be 
violated for example when the central government interferes with the work of a local 
government. This non-intervention rule parallels the concept emanating from the 
humanitarian movement of the 1820s and 1830s which recognizes the sovereignty and 
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independence of indigenous peoples. The third subprinciple derives from the first two and 
limits the legitimate support of higher levels to helping lower levels help themselves. This 
rule is violated where the positive rule is broken, for example where the federal government 
fails to correct a state government who fails to respond to an appeal for assistance from a local 
government. This third subprinciple is also violated when the negative rule is broken, for 
example, when the federal government fails to stop a state government from interfering with 
the work of a local government.  
Notwithstanding a number of different renditions of the principle, it is dominated by a 
‘state-centric’ approach,313 due to the ‘state-centric’ global order that is difficult to combine 
plausibly with non-Westphalian renditions of sovereignty, such as that of Baruch Spinoza.314 
The main renditions of subsidiarity can be represented vis-à-vis state authority as shown in 
Figure AII.1.  
 
 
Figure AII.1: Main renditions of subsidiarity relative to increasing authority of the political 
state 
 
Here an ‘organisational units’ represents a pre-existing social organisation that mediates 
between the individual and higher orders: the family, church, city, etc. In other words, the 
subsidiarity renditions that are most in favor of individual freedom under a nation-state are 
those further to the left in Figure 5.1. As we move from left to right, the rendition becomes 
more territorial—here subsidiarity does not only defend non-territorial entities such as the 
individual, the family, or the church, but more importantly territorial organizations such as 
cities or regions (at the sub-national level), and even supra-national such as the European 
Union. These renditions attach low importance to entities mediating between the individual 
and the nation-state. For an elaboration of these versions, and their advantages and 
weaknesses, refer to Føllesdal.315 One key point that is worth emphasizing here about 
subsidiarity is that it conflicts with the welfare state.316 Subsidiarity envisages a plurality of 
orders that consists of different realms of governance, which is pragmatically a ‘redline’ under 
the welfare state.  
The principle of subsidiarity is related to a number of similar principles. Salient among 
these is another structural principle known as ‘spheres of sovereignty’, which comes from 
Calvinist teachings as opposed to the Catholic origins of (modern) subsidiarity. Some suggest 
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that the two principles are complementary.317 Others point to their differences, especially that 
subsidiarity is about hierarchy, where spheres of sovereignty are about process (hence closer 
to polycentricity).318 It is also constructive to contrast subsidiarity with the principle of 
‘competence catalogues’. The latter is predicated on two doctrines: supremacy and pre-
emption.319 Another related principle is the auxilium principle which interprets subsidiarity 
as only one of the modes through which there is ‘auxilium’ between the individual and nested 
levels of government. Other modes include the fiduciary principle.320 Others have also used 
the concept of auxilium, but in a different context, namely to distinguish between subsidiarity 
which applies to a social whole,321 and an auxilium principle that applies between different 
social wholes . If we superimpose the concept of sovereignty on the ‘social whole’ we can 
integrate these principles as seen in Figure AII.2.  
 
 
 
Figure AII.2: Conceptualizing the relationship between subsidiarity, spheres of sovereignty 
and auxilium 
 
Within a given sphere of sovereignty (from the Calvinist conception), we can discern the 
operation of the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity,322 within what Gustav Ermercke calls 
a social whole (sozialen Ganzen).323 Under this construction the state is a moral organism 
(whole) analogous to a physical one (e.g. the human body).  
Some also suggest that there are only minor differences between subsidiarity and 
federalism.324 Jordan and Jeppesen suggest that subsidiarity is the defining feature of 
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federalism.325 Similarly, I see subsidiarity as a principle that encompasses federalism. In other 
words, federalism is a subset of subsidiarity. This is so given that federalism is about dividing 
powers, which is only one modality through which we can share powers as stipulated for by 
the principle of subsidiarity.326  
It is the ethical rationale that differentiates subsidiarity from centralization. Subsidiarity is 
understood as legal decentralization,327 but is intended to ensure a moral principle 
guaranteeing free will to everyone, namely human dignity.328 It is the equity criterion that 
differentiates subsidiarity from decentralization. In a sense, subsidiarity integrates efficiency 
and equity in a way similar to special and general relativity. Instead of using space and time 
as separate constructs, Einstein understood them as dimensions of the same construct. 
Subsidiarity also uses efficiency and equity as one construct: efficiency-equity. Subsidiarity 
ensures that the calculus of efficiency is always weaved into that of equity. This approach is 
hugely different from what we have come to be accustomed to under traditional approaches 
of law-and-economics, and neo-classical economics generally.  
The principle of subsidiarity has two natures. It is a prima facie rule of intuitive thinking 
(the heuristic nature). It is also a methodological principle of critical thinking (the 
methodological principle).329 Subsidiarity has three main functions:330 (1) regulate the 
allocation of powers within political or legal order, (2) structure the debate on the allocation 
of powers between various organisational scales (local, national, and global), (3) serve as a 
normative ‘constitutional principle’ to justify state authority. Melé suggests nine attributes to 
subsidiarity:331 (1) the principle arises from the concept that humans are endowed with reason 
and freedom, (2) it has a close ethical content, (3) subsidiarity has to be considered with other 
ethical principles: solidarity, authority, and participation, (4) subsidiarity has to be applied 
considering all the relevant circumstances in a situation,332 (5) the principle stipulates that 
whatever could be done by an inferior social group should not be absorbed by a superior 
organisational group, (6) the principle also stipulates that initiatives by individuals and groups 
must contribute to the good of the whole community, (7) under subsidiarity, individuals and 
inferior social groups should do as much as they can, (8) while superior entities have a duty 
to favor the initiatives of inferior groups, and last, (9) the principle requires that if an 
individual or an inferior group cannot perform a necessary activity, even if provided with 
appropriate help, then the superior group can and ought to carry out the activity.  
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E. Subsidiarity’s Economic and Ethical Foundations 
 
Historically, there were two main formulations of subsidiarity. One is economic, the other 
ethical. While Aristotle would remind us, they are two faces of the same coin, the difference 
therefore between decentralization and subsidiarity is that the latter includes an ethical 
rationale that goes beyond the economic ‘efficiency’ objective inherent in decentralization 
theories.333 Next, I discuss the economic formulation; we later turn our attention to the ethical 
one.  
Conventional public economics is predicated on a decentralization theorem that models 
incomplete contracts under uniformity and homogeneity assumptions where the central 
government can replicate the public goods supplied by local governments. Subsidiarity on the 
other hand introduces a processual mechanism that is also predicated on ethical 
considerations that signal the appropriate scale at which political organisation should be 
induced. Identifying that scale is a collective responsibility of different levels of government, 
not only the highest (national) level. Subsidiarity is hence a decentralization modality that 
takes into account the political forces of existing social structures.  The principle has its 
foundation in the right to human dignity,334 and the principle of social trust.335 The use of trust 
as the basis for describing the relationship between the state and its subjects is hardly an 
innovation.336 Recourse to general principles of justice in order to assist the ‘just’ application 
of law is a feature common to major legal systems.337 In relation to the political state, trust 
manifests itself either as either a fiduciary or subsidiarity standard. Trust emerges as a way of 
coping with the task of governing under complexity. State-subject relations emerge as a 
delicate dialectic of trust and distrust, discretion and accountability, hard legal rules and soft 
social norms. The fiduciary and subsidiarity principles maintain the integrity of relationships 
perceived to be of importance in a society. 338  As the perceptions of social interests and values 
change, so also can the ambience of these principles. In this, the true nature of the fiduciary 
and subsidiarity principles is revealed. They originate in public policy.339 However, there is 
an overarching principle that can be seen in the subsidiarity and fiduciary principles.340 The 
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need for, and existence of, this overarching ‘auxilium’ obligation (on the state towards its 
subjects) is independent of any legislative enabler, and is superior to parliamentary 
sovereignty. This superiority derives directly from the nature of social relations, although 
there are also important arguments to be made from (common law) historical analyses.341  
One of the earliest economic formulations of subsidiarity can be found in Christian 
Wolff’s Principles of Natural Law, first published in 1754.342 In section 1022, the principle is 
formulated as integral to the creation of the welfare state, where the subsidiarity principle 
keeps ‘the burden of the welfare taxes to be borne by citizens at a minimum’.343 This is so 
given that state intervention is only where individuals have ‘no relatives or friends who could 
take care’ of them.344 In this sense, the state is only subsidiary to community relationships. A 
clear statement of the ethical formulation of subsidiarity can be found in the first papal 
encyclical on the ‘social question’, Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum of 1891,345 where we see a 
principle of intervention (positive dimension) but not interference (negative dimension) based 
on the ethical objective of ‘remedy of the evil or the removal of the mischief’.346 A stronger 
and more precise version of the ethical formulation is contained in section 79 of Pius XI’s 
1931 papal encyclical paper, Quadrogesimo Anno.347 This formulation emphasizes the ethical 
constraint on larger (political) entities, preventing them from usurping duties that can be 
reasonably discharged by smaller entities. The justification for such a constraint is derived 
directly from ‘the principle of justice’.348 
The other formulation of the subsidiarity principle is ethical. The first text referring to this 
formulation was the first papal encyclical on the ‘social question’, Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum 
of 1891, where we see a principle of intervention (positive dimension) but not interference 
(negative dimension) based on the ethical objective of ‘remedy of the evil or the removal of 
the mischief’.349 A stronger and more precise version of the ethical formulation is contained 
in section 79 of Pius XI’s 1931 papal encyclical paper, Quadrogesimo Anno.350 This 
formulation emphasizes the ethical constraint on larger (political) entities, preventing them 
from usurping duties that can be reasonably discharged by smaller entities. The justification 
for such a constraint is derived directly from ‘the principle of justice’.  
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F. Subprinciples of Subsidiarity 
 
While a polysemous principle in its classical formulation, the principle of subsidiarity’s core 
could be decomposed into three interrelated subprinciples. The first is a positive version, 
where a ‘rule of assistance’ requires different levels of government to support each other 
where they cannot perform the functions of governance. The second subprinciple is the ‘ban 
on interference’, a negative version of the subsidiarity principle, where different levels of 
government are prohibited from interfering in each other’s affairs. The third subprinciple 
derives from the first two and limits the legitimate support of government to ‘helping … 
governments help themselves’.351 
Traditionally, the principle of subsidiarity has three meta-rules that govern the interaction 
of different parts of a given system or organisation.352 The first is a positive version, where 
“higher levels support lower levels in case of need”. This requires the central government to 
support local communities where they cannot perform the functions of governance. The 
second meta-rule is that “higher levels must not arrogate functions of lower levels”. This is a 
negative version of the subsidiarity principle, where the central government is prohibited from 
interfering in the affairs of local government. The third meta-rule derives from the first two 
and is implied by the hierarchical structure (micro versus macro level): the first and second 
meta-rules apply to all scales within the system (under subsidiarity there would be a minimum 
of at least three scales—individual, local or regional, and national or supra-national).353 
 
Using this reconstruction of subsidiarity we can now elucidate how it maps onto self-
organisation.354  
 
G. Subsidiarity as Self-Organisation 
 
Self-organisation,355 also known as spontaneous order,356 refers to the ability of acquiring 
and maintaining a structure without external control. Self-organisation is associated with 
(non-equilibrium) pattern formation.357 The evolutionary process itself could be viewed as 
self-organizing, and hence leading to emergent properties.358 This is part of an ongoing 
convergence of evolutionary and complexity thinking.359  
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Self-organisation has four characteristics. 360 First, it restricts the behavior of the system to 
a small region called an attractor (see below), which gives the system a structure. Second, 
self-organisation is possible only where there is freedom from external control. Third, self-
organisation provides adaptable behavior that makes the system robust to change (in the 
external environment). Fourth, it is a process that evolves over time towards more order (as 
an evolutionary fitness trait). These characteristics could be distilled to three essential 
ingredients: there needs to be many interactions between micro-scale (or lower scale) entities 
(which is the genesis of the principle of solidarity), non-linearity of these interactions (in the 
form of positive and negative feedback loops signifying both competition and cooperation), 
and a balance between interactions resulting in competition, and those resulting in cooperation 
(or exploration and exploitation).  
The dynamics of highly complex systems exhibit a combination of positive and negative 
feedbacks.361 This feedback means that causation in such systems in nonlinear. In other words, 
self-organizations exhibits negative and positive feedback that enables emergence to occur 
but to also influence the structure of the system at the micro-level.  
The ideas of Friedrich Hayek on spontaneous order could help illustrate self-
organisation.362 Hayek even coined a new word, ‘catallaxy’, to describe a self-organizing 
system where voluntary co-operation dominates competition.363 For Hayek there are two types 
of order. The first is described as ‘taxis’: an ‘organisation’ which is ‘made’ or ‘artificial’. The 
second is referred to as ‘cosmos’: a ‘spontaneous order’ which is ‘grown’ endogenously and 
is self-organizing. The primary example of cosmos is any society of a size larger than that of 
a tribe or clan. City-regions are the quintessential cosmos.364 For Hayek, when one canvases 
regions of high complexity, one would be able to find only spontaneous order. The high 
complexity of such order is the result of elements adapting to their environment (in other 
words evolution). A primary example of this high complexity is “the structure of the modern 
society”. In any given society, micro-level entities such as families and firms, which are 
organizations, are integrated into “a more comprehensive” (micro-level) spontaneous order.365  
In addition, Hayek explains that the elements of spontaneous order will often adapt to the 
environment through a process of abstraction. Through evolution, “a repertory of action type 
adapted to standard features of the environment. Organisms become capable of ever greater 
varieties of actions…”366 Hayek also asserts that “the formation of a new abstraction seems 
never to be the outcome of a conscious process, not something at which the mind can 
deliberately aim, but always a discovery of something which already guides its operation.”367 
(Emphasis in the original). Hayek explains the role of abstraction in the emergence of new 
behavior in the following terms:368 
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“It is the determination of particular actions by various combinations of abstract 
properties which makes it possible for a causally determined structure of actions to 
produce ever new actions it has never before, and therefore to produce altogether 
new behavior such as we do not expect from what we usually describe as a 
mechanism. Even a relatively limited repertory of abstract rules that can thus be 
combined into particular actions will be capable of ‘creating’ an almost infinite 
variety of particular actions.”  
 
Hayek hence proposes that self-organisation (qua spontaneous order) results in emergence 
through the process of abstraction.369  
 
 
H. Subsidiarity and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
The principle of subsidiarity can be interpreted as a way of overcoming the prisoner’s 
dilemma. Here subsidiarity represents a dynamic continuum of coordination states, leading 
for individualism to (strong) collectivism at states of increasing coordination (cooperation). 
The main issue with common interest is the existence of a ‘free rider’ incentive. This can be 
explained with the following canonical form of the prisoner’s dilemma. See Table AII.1. Let’s 
assume that A is an individual and B is a social group in which A is a member: 𝐴 ∈ 𝐵. Both 
are assumed to be rational and self-interested. Both A and B are assume to have 
consciousness.  
 
 
Canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoff Matrix 
 B Cooperates B Defects 
A Cooperates  (𝛽, 𝛽) (𝛿, 𝛼) 
A Defects  (𝛼, 𝛿) (𝛾, 𝛾) 
 
Where 𝛼 > 𝛽 > 𝛾 > 𝛿 
 
Table AII.1: The payoff matrix for the prisoner’s dilemma showing absolute payoffs  
 
The orthodox analysis of this game suggests A and B will choose not to cooperate, which 
leads to a  (𝛾, 𝛾) payoff. However, if we now assume that A and B adhere to the principle of 
subsidiarity, irrespective of any informational asymmetries, the following calculus takes 
place. Under this calculus what is important is not the absolute payoff of each player, but their 
relative payoffs. This is a mirror image of what biologists call ‘evolutionary spite’.370 If A and 
                                                          
369 Also refer to the dialectic between symmetry and symmetry breaking discussed in B. F. Gussen, On the problem of scale: 
Hayek, Kohr, Jacobs and the reinvention of the political state, 24 (1) Constitutional Political Economy 19 (2013). 
370 See for example W. D. Hamilton, Selfish and Spiteful Behaviour in an Evolutionary Model, 228 Nature 1218 (19 December 
1970). Compare to Alexander William Salter, Sovereignty as Exchange of Political Property Rights, 165 (1) Public Choice 79 
(2015). 
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B obtain different payoffs, i.e. (𝛼, 𝛿) or (𝛿, 𝛼), then the rule of assistance would require A 
and B to rectify this difference. Assistance would be possible up to the point where both 
achieve the same payoff. This means A and B would want to move either to (𝛽, 𝛽) or (𝛾, 𝛾). 
Under the rule of non-interference A and B are indifferent between (𝛽, 𝛽) and (𝛾, 𝛾) as both 
get the same payoff. Non-interference occurs as a negative condition where no further help is 
possible. However, under the third subprinciple (above), both A and B would want to improve 
their outcome by moving to (𝛽, 𝛽). Applying the subprinciples of subsidiarity would 
overcome the free-rider incentive.  
The above analysis does not mean that the free-rider incentive disappears under the 
subsidiarity principle, but that having clear rules for interaction between multi-levels of 
governance (including the individual) is one way of overcoming the issue of free riding.  
 
 
I. Subsidiarity and Methodological Collectivism 
 
In this part I expand on the understanding of subsidiarity as collectivism, especially in its 
universitas version. For us to understand this aspect of subsidiarity we also need to engage 
the concept of sovereignty.  
The state qua universitas replaces sovereignty with subsidiarity (its limited version of 
federalism to be precise).371 Sovereignty was developed to furnish justification for ‘who’ 
holds (absolute) supreme power. On the other hand, subsidiarity focuses on ‘how’ that 
supreme power is shared (divided) through a continuum that stretches from the individual to 
the highest level of governance structures (national or supra-national). The origin of 
subsidiarity is traced to ancient Greece.372 However, some suggest it has evolved within 
federal governmental regimes.373 Others argue subsidiarity derives from methodological 
individualism (see above),374 suggesting a bottom-up legitimization of authority.375 
Regardless of its origin or rational basis, subsidiarity poses a threat to sovereignty.376 
Subsidiarity “does not reconstitute the sovereign state as the object of its concern. It explicitly 
contemplates intervention and assistance for the purpose of protecting human dignity”.377  A 
nexus with human rights means that the principle is neither contractarian nor utilitarian. 
Furthermore, today the principle does not make any normative claims on the structure of 
political or economic organization.378 The principle remains paradoxical in that it limits the 
state, but also empowers and justifies it. It reduces the relationship between the national and 
the local scales to a one-dimensional functional exchange.379 While sovereignty, even if only 
implicitly, gives permanence to the national scale, (the strong version of) subsidiarity takes 
away that permanence: “Subsidiarity has updated the concept of decentralization … No longer 
                                                          
371 For the similarities and difference between subsidiarity and federalism, see B. F. Gussen, Subsidiarity as a constitutional 
principle in New Zealand, 12 (1) New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 123 (2014).  
372 Chantal Millon-Delsol, L’État subsidiaire : ingérence et non-ingérence de l'État, le principe de subsidiarité aux fondements 
de l'histoire européenne at 15-27 (Presses Universitaires de France 1992). 
373 Scot Macdonald and Gunnar Nielsson, Linkages Between the Concepts of ‘Subsidiarity’ and Sovereignty: The New Debate 
Over Allocation of Authority in the European Union, in Fourth European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Biennial 
Conference (1995). 
374 Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 (38) The American Journal 
of International Law 42 (2003). 
375 Scot Macdonald and Gunnar Nielsson, Linkages Between the Concepts of ‘Subsidiarity’ and Sovereignty (1995). 
376 John Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union at 26 
(Cavendish Publishing 2002).  
377 Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law at 58.  
378 At 44.  
379 Chantal Millon-Delsol, L'État subsidiaire : ingérence et non-ingérence de l'État, le principe de subsidiarité aux fondements 
de l'histoire européenne at 8 (Presses Universitaires de France 1992).  
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must arguments be made for the devolution of power from the nation-state. Instead the nation-
state itself must defend its legitimacy against claims from communities demanding greater 
control over decision making”.380  The key point is that without proper constitutional 
constraints (see the discussion on Spinoza below) there will always be a cyclical dynamic that 
underlines the tension between societas and universitas.  
There is now a considerable body of literature suggesting the nation-state is obsolete and 
is no more the optimal unit for organizing economic activity.381 Thanks to the information 
revolution, the glocal—the intertwining of the global and the local, is taking precedence over 
the national.382 This withering of the nation-state is ushering a new form of ‘universitas’ that 
attacks sovereignty not only from within the (nation) state, but by attacking the state itself. 
An example at hand is that of Italy with its industrialized north and rural south.383 Moreover, 
there is now a decoupling of the democratic process from the bulk of the working population. 
Governments have become hostage to political parties that represent special interests rather 
than the majority. The result being the adoption of policies (both at the national and sub-
national levels) that make no economic sense.384 These gyrations are summed up by Gianni 
De Michelis, a former foreign minister of Italy, as follows: “We are witnessing the explosion 
of a long-obsolete model of liberal democracy that can no longer accommodate our dynamic, 
complex societies with their sophisticated electorate of vast diversity and highly differentiated 
interest”.385  Today sovereignty is largely seen as declining in the aftermath of increasing 
global economic integration, which continues to be dominated by one particular modality: 
globalization.386 A new conception of the nation-state has emerged: the state as a network. 387 
Some however argue that “[t]he claim that globalization is undermining sovereignty is 
exaggerated and historically myopic,”388 adding that “indicators such as regulatory power and 
macroeconomic autonomy are ahistorical. They refer to state functions that were either never 
fully performed by sovereign states or only assumed very recently by such states”.389 
Notwithstanding, states are no longer able to protect themselves from the negative actions of 
other states or outside groups.390 Sovereignty is not the absolute it used to be. It is now 
relative.391 There is now imperial sovereignty that “signals the end of the idea of the modern 
state … and of a relational sovereignty based on a territorial unit …” (Emphasis added).392 
The link between sovereignty and territoriality is being replaced by arrangements where state 
                                                          
380 John Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union at 29 
(Cavendish Publishing 2002). 
381 Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of the Regional Economics  (HarperCollins 1995). See also Jean-
Marie Guéhenno, The End of The Nation-State (University of Mnnesota Press 1995); Daniel Chernilo, A Social Theory of The 
Nation-State (Routledge 2007), and David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger and Steven C. Topik eds States and Sovereignty in 
the Global Economy (Routledge 1999).   
382 On glocalisation see for example P. S. Gopalakrishnan Glocalization: thinking global, acting local (Icfai University Press 
2008).  
383 Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of the Regional Economics at 16. 
384 At 56. 
385 At 60.  
386 Joseph A. Camilleri, Rethinking sovereignty in a shrinking fragmented world, in RBJ Walker and Saul H Mendlovitz eds 
Contending sovereignties: redefining political community at 38 (Lynne Rienner Publishers 1990).  
387 J. Agnew and S.  Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory, and International Political Economy at 89 (Routledge  
1995). Cited in Andrew Herod Scale at 200 (Routledge 2011).  
388 Stephen D. Krasner, Globalization and Sovereignty at 34, in David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik eds 
States and Soveignty in the Global Economy 34 (Routledge 1999).  
389 Eric Helleiner, Sovereignty, Territoriality and the Globalization of Finance at 138 and 149, in David A. Smith, Dorothy J. 
Solinger, and Steven C. Topik eds States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy 138 (Routledge 1999). 
390 Steven Lee, A Puzzle of Sovereignty, in Neil Walker ed Relocating Sovereignty 29 (Ashgate Dartmouth, 2006). 
391 Martin Loughlin, Ten Tenets of Sovereignty at 107-108, in Neil Walker ed Relocating Sovereignty 79 (Ashgate Dartmouth 
2006). Citing Michel Foucault Power at 324 (New Press 2000). For Foucault’s views on sovereignty see Brian C. J. Singer and 
Lorna Weir, Politics and sovereign power: considerations on Foucault, 9 (4) European Journal of Social Theory 443 (2006). 
392 Martin Loughlin, Ten Tenets of Sovereignty at 108-109.  
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jurisdiction is punctured by multi-level governance.393 The empirical and theoretical 
developments of the late twentieth century have “led to a more fundamental questioning of 
how national boarders themselves have been conceptualized”.394 Similarly, in the European 
context, one can identify two (proto-glocal) constitutional revolutions since the end of World 
War II (WWII). The first is resulting in the more visible creation of pan-European institutions. 
The second is the counter-unitary-state revolution that started in the 1920s, but reached its 
height in the decades after WWII. This revolution saw the creation of sub-national, meso-
scale, democratic institutions—especially ‘regional states’, that filled the space between the 
national and the local scales. By the 1990s, even the United Kingdom finally joined this 
constitutional revolution with the passing of the devolution Acts (The Scotland Act 1998, The 
Government of Wales Act 1998, and the Northern Ireland Act 1998).395 There is now evidence 
in the United Kingdom, of the emergence of ‘polycentric states’.396 
Sovereignty is hence targeted by ‘the unravelling of territoriality’, which is a constitutive 
element of the state. A prime example of this is the disappearance of “territorially 
homogenous and exclusive” currencies  that “accompanied the emergence of the ‘nation-
state’”.397 Notwithstanding, it has to be said that capital mobility is not necessarily behind the 
fraying of state territoriality. Hence, the introduction of the Euro was also motivated by 
political calculations outside of already high levels of capital mobility. Moreover, financial 
globalization per se does not necessarily pose a challenge to territorial currencies as can be 
seen in the growth of ‘local currencies’.398  
Others argue that the effect of universitas (qua economic integration through the modality 
of globalization) on sovereignty is part of a cyclical process indigenous to capital 
accumulation, where the pendulum swings between the polar positions of universitas and 
societas. This effect of globalization on sovereignty demonstrates the cyclical processes of 
‘production of scale’ and ‘collapse’ where there is no constitutional constraint on the growth 
of the jurisdictional footprint of the state (refer to section 3). The last five centuries have seen 
more emphasis on societas, first in the European context, and later on globally, through the 
instruments of international law.399 However, we now see a shift in emphasis,400 even though 
the present wave of economic integration is not novel except for its scale:401   
“In each of the four systemic cycles of accumulation [marked by the migration of 
economic hegemony on the world stage from Genoa, to the Dutch, to the British, 
and last to the United States] that we can identify in the history of world capitalism 
from its earliest beginnings in late-medieval Europe to the present, periods 
characterized by a rapid and stable expansion of world trade and production 
inevitably ended in a crisis of over-accumulation that ushered in a period of 
heightened competition, financial expansion, and eventual breakdown of the 
                                                          
393 J. Allen and A.  Cochrane, Beyond the Territorial Fix: Regional Assemblages, Politics and Power, 41 (9) Regional Studies 
1161 (2007). Cited in Andrew Herod Scale at 201 (Routledge 2011).  
394 Andrew Herod Scale at 201-202. 
395 John Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union (Cavendish 
Publishing 2002). 
396 K. Morgan, The Polycentric State: New Spaces of Empowerment and Engagement?, 41 (9) Regional Studies 1237, 1238 
(2007).  
397 Eric Helleiner, Sovereignty, Territoriality and the Globalization of Finance at 138, in David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, 
and Steven C. Topik eds States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy 138 (Routledge 1999).  
398 At 152.  
399 Giovanni Arrighi, Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the "Endless" Accumulation of Capital, in David A. Smith, Dorothy 
J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik eds States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy 53 (Routledge 1999).  
400 See for example Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an Age of Global Multilevel 
Governance, 37 (2) Fordham Urban Law Journal 509 (2010). 
401 Giovanni Arrighi, Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the "Endless" Accumulation of Capital at 55. 
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organizational structures on which the preceding expansion of trade and production 
had been based … these periods of intensifying competition [are] the time when the 
leader of the preceding expansion … is gradually displaced … by an emerging new 
leadership.” 
After the Hobbesian Leviathan (first published in 1651),402 a sovereign state was conceived 
of as a territorial jurisdiction: “the territorial limits within which state authority may be 
exercised on an exclusive basis”403 (emphasis added). Today, however, “[e]merging forms of 
‘complex sovereignty’ break down the internal structural coherence of the state”.404 Today’s 
jurisprudence “became the jurisprudence of a fracturing state, characterized by polycentric 
centers of power …”405 These polycentric centers of power are an extension of the idea of 
shared sovereignty which could be traced back to ancient Greece.406  However, this idea did 
not re-emerge (in the form of federalism) until 1756 when John Locke revived the idea of the 
Social Contract, paving the way for the rise of federal states as exemplified by the United 
States (US 1789 constitution),407 and the Swiss federation (in the 1848, 1874, and 1999 
constitutions).408 However, sovereignty was expected to still operate from within the state. 
Since the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and especially in the post-Napoleonic 
era (after 1815), “a prominent operating principle regulating the size and shape of states has 
indeed been that states should be contiguous and non-perforated”409 (emphasis added). This 
should be understood in relation to the observation that “the Westphalian State is … bound 
symbiotically to the ideology of nationalism”.410 The relationship between sovereignty and 
territory is captured by the principle of uti possidetis juris “according to which existing [state] 
boundaries are the pre-emptive basis for determining territorial jurisdictions in the absence of 
mutual agreement to do otherwise”.411 In particular, this principle subordinated the principle 
of self-determination to boundaries decided by colonial powers: juridical-territories trumped 
sociological-territories.412  
The ‘modern state ideal’ is described as that where “a political economy would very much 
seem to be that of a geographically circumscribed area within which exists a more or less 
fixed political hierarchy, which includes all individuals and all political institutions, and 
whose physical extension is contiguous and non-perforated”.413 It could be argued that the 
collapse of the gold standard, the emergence of Keynesian economics, and European 
decolonization had the combined effect that in the mid-twentieth century the world 
increasingly came to be “pictured in the form of nation-states, with each state marking the 
boundary of a distinct economy”.414 The nation-state (since the eighteenth century) remains 
the principal territorial unit. Nations result from a process of production of scale that is 
                                                          
402 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Pacific Publishing Studio 2011). 
403 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape at 3, in Neil Walker 
ed Relocating Sovereignty 3 (Ashgate Dartmouth 2006). Published earlier in 47 (3) Political Studies 431 (1999).  
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Aristotle’s sovereignty, see R. G. Mulgan, Aristotle's Sovereign, 18 (4) Political Studies 518 (1970). 
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411 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: The Evolution of an Idea at 110 (Polity Press 2007).  
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enforced on a given territory. France is a prime example of this process.415 Critique of this 
national scale and the contiguous non-porous nation-state is relatively rare in the 
(constitutional) political economy literature, notwithstanding the now widely accepted claim 
that a decentralized political community would better meet heterogeneous individual 
preferences.416 Keeping in mind of course that decentralization would obtain only under the 
auspices of the nation-state.  
 
 
 
J. Subsidiarity and Methodological Individualism 
 
I now proceed to elaborate on subsidiarity and the interconnection between this principle 
and methodological individualism as exhibited by the concept of referenda.417 Subsidiarity is 
a principle that is “anchored in the concept of sovereignty of the individual,” where “all other 
levels of social organisation are given a subsidiary role, taking up only those tasks and 
responsibilities that are beyond the capacity of the individual.”418 Subsidiarity envisages 
‘onion-like’ layers of socio-political structures where the bulk of decision-making is taken at 
the lowest scales. Subsidiarity “holds that the burden of argument lies with attempts to 
centralize authority.”419 In other words, subsidiarity is built on the ideas of methodological 
individualism and methodological collectivism.420  This formulates the basis for the link 
between subsidiarity and referenda on the one hand (through methodological individualism), 
and subsidiarity and federalism on the other (through methodological collectivism). The 
principle hence places a constitutional responsibility on higher levels of government not only 
to enable the autonomy of lower levels, but to provide these lower levels with necessary 
support.421  
The sovereignty of the individual under subsidiarity leads to referenda. Referenda were 
used by Germanic tribes before being adopted by Switzerland in the sixteenth century.422 The 
German word for referenda is ‘Volksbefragung’ which literally means ‘asking the people’.423 
Referenda correspond in their widest sense to the maxim ‘vox popli, vox dei,’ where they 
‘devolve’ decision-making to individuals. Referenda are analogous to opinion polls, although 
the former are more authoritative and comprehensive than the latter.424 England itself is in 
                                                          
415 John Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union at 8 (Cavendish 
Publishing 2002). 
416 See for example James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy (University of Michigan Press 1962). 
417 For a good introduction to this principle in English, see Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann eds Global Perspectives 
on Subsidiarity (Springer 2014); Alessandro Colombo ed Subsidiarity Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Models 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2012).  
418 Bhajan Grewal, Economic Perspectives on Federalism, in A Federalism for the 21st Century at 41, 44 (Committee for 
Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) 2014).  
419 Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity and the Global Order at 207 and 208, in Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann eds 
Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity 207 (Springer 2014).  
420 Methodological individualism asserts that explaining sociological phenomena must be anchored in facts about the 
individual. Methodological collectivism, however, holds that sociological phenomena are explained by social institutions as 
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422 Matt Qvortrup, Introduction: Theory, Practice and History at 3-4, in Matt Qvortrup ed Referendums Around the World: The 
Continued Growth of Direct Democracy 1 (Palgrave Macmillan 2014).  
423 The Latin word ‘referendum’ comes from the verb ‘refero’ which in turn means ‘to give up’ (to the people).   
424 Graeme Orr, The conduct of Referenda and Plebiscites in Australia: A Legal Perspective at 117, 11 Public Law Review 117 
(2000). The referendum could be seen as an interpretation of subsidiarity in the following terms: 
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fact the birthplace of modern referenda under the Levellers movement of the mid-seventeenth 
century. At the same time, we see referenda as part of the law-making process in New 
England.425 Since then the use of referenda ‘has proliferated remarkably [especially since the 
1970s].’426 Referenda are ‘used twice as frequently today compared with fifty years ago and 
almost four times more than at the turn of the twentieth century.’427  The reason for this 
proliferation, according to the input-output model of political systems, where input is first 
articulated by civic society, which is then aggregated by political parties into legislation;  is 
that the alignment between the inflexible and highly institutionalized ‘articulators’ and the 
dynamic ‘aggregators’ had broken down.  
It was Switzerland who first made referenda a cornerstone of political systems. Their use 
was first introduced at the cantonal level, as early as 1830, when it was possible to amend the 
cantonal constitution or repeal a legislation using a referendum. Referenda were later used at 
the federal level, first to amend the constitution (since 1848), and later to repeal ordinary law 
(since 1874). The last evolutionary step was the introduction of citizen-initiated referenda 
which occurred for the first time in 1891. 
Similarly, in the United States referenda were first used for approval of state constitutions 
and constitutional amendments, and later, gradually, ‘states also began to confer upon the 
people the right to legislate directly upon subjects other than constitutional questions.’428 
Referenda are based on methodological individualism as seen in consociational, 
confederal and liberal (contractarian) subsidiarity.429 Under methodological individualism 
only individuals choose and act.430 The decisions are made by individuals, not collectives.431 
Carl Menger, who founded the Austrian School of Economics, and is considered the founder 
of methodological individualism,432 was open to the idea that economic analysis can be based 
on units larger than the individuals (such as the city or the state), although the ultimate 
explanation of all phenomena must be the individual.433 The doctrine means that “all social 
phenomena (their structure and their change) are in principle explicable only in terms of 
                                                          
‘Aye’ or ‘No’ as clearly as if they were gathered together in a market-place or a Senate House.’ [Sir Robert 
Randolph Garran, The Coming Commonwealth at 134 (Angus and Robertson 1897).] 
 
425 Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall at 12 (Harvard University Press 
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426 S. Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation at 1 (Oxford University Press 
2012). Quoted in Matt Qvortrup, Introduction: Theory, Practice and History at 11, in Matt Qvortrup ed Referendums Around 
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427 David Altman, Direct Democracy Worldwide at 65 (Cambridge University Press 2011). Quoted in Matt Qvortrup ed 
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428 Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall at 42 (Harvard University Press 
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429 There are different strands of methodological individualism. See Lars Udehn, Methodological Individualism: Background, 
History and Meaning at 347 (Routledge 2001). For our purposes this detail is not essential. 
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methodological pluralist, closer to the Austrian tradition and to Emile Durkheim’s interpretation of social facts as sui generis 
and therefore irreducible to facts about individuals. See Udehn, Methodological Individualism: Background, History and 
Meaning at 106 and 34. This Weberian concept suggests that while we talk about states (and other social organizations) as 
capable of action just like an individual, these collectives must still be treated as the resultants of individual acts, since only 
individuals can be treated as having a subjectively understandable action. For Weber, ‘action’ refers to the subset of human 
behaviour that is motivated by an intentional state. (For example: coughing is behaviour, apologizing afterwards is action.) 
Methodological individualism stands in opposition to historicism and structural functionalism as determinants of individual 
behaviour. Its use in economic analysis was promoted first by the Austrian School of economics. For a more detailed account, 
refer to Joseph Heath, Methodological Individualism, in Edward N. Zalta ed The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Stanford University Press 2011). 
431 It follows that parliaments don’t make decision but members of parliament do, and this is only a second best approach as it 
only uses a sample of the larger body of decisions-makers, namely the electorate. When it is cost effective to consult a larger 
sample (especially due to a low frequency of such consultations), and the issues are of high importance that merits the same, 
then subsidiarity enshrines a right to referenda.  
432 Lars Udehn, Methodological Individualism: Background, History and Meaning at 94 (Routledge 2001). 
433 Carl Menger, Problems of Economics and Sociology at 193-96 (University of Illinois Press 1963).  
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individuals—their properties, goals, and beliefs.”434 Methodological individualism allows for 
‘revolutionary’ changes to the political state that do not take into account historical ‘meso’ 
scales of social organisation. It only allows for the micro of the individual from which is born 
the macro of the nation-state. This is in contrast to methodological collectivism which adopts 
an evolutionary understanding of the state where jurisdictional breakup is a ‘natural’ 
biological consequence of both growth and eventual death (of the state). Emphasis on 
methodological individualism allows for the state to grow in ‘revolutionary’ ways both 
through the speed of growth as well as its nature.  
                                                          
434 Jon Elster, Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: The Case for Methodological Individualism, 11 (4) Theory and 
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